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ON THE PROPERTIZATION OF DATA AND THE
HARMONIZATION IMPERATIVE
Luis Miguel M. del Rosario*
The digital age has paved the way for unforeseen and unconscionable
harms. Recent experiences with security breaches, surveillance programs,
and mass disinformation campaigns have taught us that unchecked data
collection, use, retention, and transfer have the potential to affect everything
from health-care access to national security. And they have shown the
growing need for a solution that addresses this proliferation of intangible
collective harms.
This Note champions data propertization—the process of establishing a
bundle of rights in data comparable to those that comprise property
interests—as the proper method for preventing and redressing data harms.
More specifically, this Note analyzes Illinois’s Biometric Information
Privacy Act, California’s Consumer Privacy Act, Virginia’s Consumer Data
Protection Act, and Colorado’s Privacy Act to show that data propertization
is already underway under the banner of data protection and privacy. In
each case, state law advances data propertization by empowering individuals
with a bundle of rights that mirror emblematic property rights to possess,
exclude, and alienate, while establishing a framework for enforcement of
those rights.
Notwithstanding this development, this Note also illustrates that
differences between the four laws have exposed gaps in rights and
enforcement, which only fragment and jeopardize data propertization. To
address this issue, this Note prescribes a harmonized bundle of rights best
suited to developing property interests in data and argues that those rights
should be codified in federal law, dually enforced through agency
enforcement and a private right of action. By eliminating gaps between
existing data propertization laws and preventing the proliferation of others,
such an approach would spur the development of a more cohesive and more
significant property interest in data that is more capable of withstanding a
new age of digital harms.
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INTRODUCTION
Our technology knows us better than we know ourselves. On Instagram,
targeted advertising so effectively predicts consumer preferences that many
believed the platform was secretly recording their conversations.1 Similarly,
TikTok’s video recommendations algorithm is so skilled at learning about
users’ interests that it seamlessly curates “For You” pages with shocking
accuracy and granular specificity.2 Google Maps, meanwhile, boasts the
ability to predict traffic flows almost an hour into the future.3 And everyday
appliances equipped with Amazon Dash sensors can place an order for printer
toner, coffee pods, and laundry detergent before you can even think to check
how much was left.4
Indeed, the digital age has brought about technologies that have propelled
past our wildest imaginations into fixtures of everyday, inexorable necessity.
And those technologies are driven by data—the infamously abstract,
catch-all term for electronic information created, collected, stored, and
transferred across the digital world.5 Engagement data powers Instagram’s
advertising and TikTok’s recommendations engine, location data allows
Google Maps to predict traffic flows, and sensor data prompts
Amazon Dash–enabled appliances to place refill orders.6 Individual pieces
of this data, standing alone, may contribute little to those technologies, but in
the aggregate, data plays a valuable and outsized role in the digital era. As
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development summarizes,
“[t]he [value and] volume of data only increases with its collection and use,
creating a deep well of possibility for scientific discovery and for improving
existing or inventing new products and services.”7
1. See Kaitlyn Tiffany, The Perennial Debate About Whether Your Phone Is Secretly
Listening to You, Explained, VOX (Dec. 28, 2021, 11:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/thegoods/2018/12/28/18158968/facebook-microphone-tapping-recording-instagram-adsj
[https://perma.cc/X29L-WQVW]. Instagram’s CEO debunked this claim. See Head of
Instagram Adam Mosseri Sits Down for Interview with Gayle King, CBS NEWS
(June 25, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/video/head-of-instagram-adam-mosseri-sitsdown-for-interview-with-gayle-king/ [https://perma.cc/JN9K-JKPF].
2. “One viral video laid out TikTok’s communities like a treasure map: to get to the
wholesome world of Frog TikTok, you had to leave Straight TikTok, find your way to Stoner
Witch or Cottagecore, pass through Trans and Non-Binary, and ‘go through the portal to reach
the promised land.’” Abby Ohlheiser, TikTok: Recommendation Algorithms, MIT TECH. REV.,
Mar.–Apr. 2021, at 52, 52–53; see also Inside TikTok’s Algorithm: A WSJ Video
Investigation, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2021, 10:26 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktokalgorithm-video-investigation-11626877477 [https://perma.cc/L9BY-K6DC].
3. See Johann Lau, Google Maps 101: How AI Helps Predict Traffic and Determine
Routes, GOOGLE (Sept. 3, 2020), https://blog.google/products/maps/google-maps-101-how-aihelps-predict-traffic-and-determine-routes/ [https://perma.cc/Q24G-7YCU].
4. See Amazon Dash Replenishment, AMAZON, https://developer.amazon.com/enUS/alexa/dash-services [https://perma.cc/8YZB-QMRC] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
5. See Data, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/data
[https://perma.cc/837M-ZZ93] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022) (defining “data” as “information that
is produced or stored by a computer”).
6. See supra notes 1–4.
7. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., DATA IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2019),
https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/data-in-the-digital-age.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8QPB-
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But there is always a danger in having too much of a good thing. Just as
data has propelled technology to new heights, its unchecked collection,
retention, use, and transfer have paved the way for unforeseen and
unconscionable new harms.8 In August 2021, hackers breached T-Mobile
servers and placed the sensitive data of up to one hundred million customers
on sale in the dark web, exposing them to identity theft and account
takeovers.9 More ominously, a startup named Clearview AI was able to build
a revolutionary facial recognition program capable of identifying strangers
and “revealing not just their names but where they lived, what they did and
whom they knew” by scraping over three billion user images from millions
of websites.10 And, throughout 2016, an advertising agency called Copley
Advertising ran a campaign that extracted and used location data to send
anti-abortion smartphone ads to whoever stepped foot in or near reproductive
health clinics across the country.11 In each of these examples, unchecked
data collection by one entity—even in support of otherwise innocent
activity—paved the way for abuse by another.12
These excesses can affect the community, too. In 2018, the Cambridge
Analytica scandal showed that swaying a presidential election required little
more than combing through fifty million or so Facebook profiles for
demographic data and using it to “identify and target political hot buttons
YPZG]. Data is now such a critical resource that it is often called “the new oil.” See, e.g., The
World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-nolonger-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/Q4CY-22ZA].
8. See, e.g., Simon Chandler, We’re Giving Away More Personal Data than Ever,
Despite Growing Risks, VENTUREBEAT (Feb. 24, 2019, 8:35 AM), https://venturebeat.com/
2019/02/24/were-giving-away-more-personal-data-than-ever-despite-growing-risks/
[https://perma.cc/5HB7-E6R6]; see also Colin J. Bennett, Convergence Revisited: Toward a
Global Policy for the Protection of Personal Data?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW
LANDSCAPE 99, 103 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (“One’s privacy is now
less threatened by the omniscient gaze of a centralized ‘Big Brother’ than by the unknown and
unseen collection, matching, and profiling of transactional data, a trail of which is left by every
one of us as we purchase goods, apply for services, make entertainment choices, and so on.
The ‘new surveillance’ is decentralized, routine, [and] increasingly global . . . .”).
9. See Brian Barrett, The T-Mobile Data Breach Is One You Can’t Ignore, WIRED
(Aug. 16, 2021, 4:44 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/t-mobile-hack-data-phishing/
[https://perma.cc/H4LV-V57X]; see also PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICANS AND PRIVACY:
CONCERNED, CONFUSED AND FEELING LACK OF CONTROL OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION
10 (2019) (“Roughly three-in-ten Americans (28%) say they have suffered at least one of three
kinds of major identity theft problems in the previous 12 months at the time of the survey”).
10. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy As We Know It, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacyfacial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/47YE-QSJD].
11. See Christina Cauterucci, Anti-Abortion Groups Are Now Sending Targeted
Smartphone Ads to Women in Abortion Clinics, SLATE (May 26, 2016, 4:31 PM),
https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/05/anti-abortion-groups-are-sending-targetedsmartphone-ads-to-women-in-abortion-clinics.html [https://perma.cc/59RZ-97EL].
12. Cf. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 33–39 (2015) (finding that minimizing the collection and retention of
data makes data breaches less likely, reduces the potential harms of data breaches, and
minimizes the risk of data being used in a way that departs from the purpose for which it was
initially collected).
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down to the voter level.”13 And in 2020, former President Donald Trump
ignited a mini-diplomatic crisis when he sought to ban TikTok in the United
States over national security concerns that the app was collecting data on
American users.14 These and similar experiences have taught us that
unchecked data collection, use, retention, and transfer have the potential to
affect everything from health-care access to national security. As Professor
Julie Cohen notes, “The gradual but accelerating movement to informational
capitalism has confronted the judicial system with two large and interrelated
problems: a proliferation of asserted harms that are intangible, collective,
and highly informationalized; and an unmanageably large and
ever-increasing number of claimants and interests.”15
How do we fix these issues? Some believe that no change is required
because litigation and public pressure adequately cure past harms while
deterring new ones.16 Cambridge Analytica, after all, shut down after
immense public scrutiny,17 and Trump was able to force a sale of TikTok’s
American operations to American companies.18 Similarly, some argue that
because regulation is hardly a panacea, the technology industry should be left
to regulate itself as it has for decades.19 Indeed, in the past year alone, Apple
began to require “Ask App Not to Track” buttons in apps so that users can
opt out of data monitoring and sharing,20 and Google reconfigured its
13. Hal Berghel, Malice Domestic: The Cambridge Analytica Dystopia, COMPUT., May
2018, at 84, 85; see also Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the
Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/
17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/N8WU-RTEV].
14. See Elizabeth Lopatto, In 2020, the Trump Administration Declared War on Dancing
Teens, VERGE (Dec. 16, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.theverge.com/22174704/2020-tiktokban-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/HMP6-QVLD].
15. JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 144 (2019).
16. See, e.g., Heidi Messer, Opinion, Why We Should Stop Fetishizing Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/opinion/privacy-techcompanies.html [https://perma.cc/585Y-FHXM].
17. See Colin Lecher, Cambridge Analytica Is Shutting Down, VERGE (May 2, 2018,
2:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/2/17311892/cambridge-analytica-us-officesshutting-down-facebook-scandal [https://perma.cc/9SHK-5PCZ].
18. See Bobby Allyn, Trump’s TikTok Deal: What Just Happened and Why Does It
Matter?, NPR (Sept. 21, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/21/915043052/
trumps-tiktok-deal-what-just-happened-and-why-does-it-matter
[https://perma.cc/5PKQD8NX]. That sale was later put on hold by President Joe Biden. See John D. McKinnon &
Alex Leary, TikTok Sale to Oracle, Walmart Is Shelved As Biden Reviews Security, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 10, 2021, 5:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-sale-to-oracle-walmart-isshelved-as-biden-reviews-security-11612958401 [https://perma.cc/S53Z-RPHA].
19. See Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation,
Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 457–59 (2011); see also Cass
R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 441 (1990) (noting
that “regulatory programs have not always succeeded, and the paradoxes of the regulatory
state have been a pervasive source of its problems”).
20. See Brian X. Chen, To Be Tracked or Not?: Apple Is Now Giving Us the Choice, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/26/technology/personaltech/appleapp-tracking-transparency.html [https://perma.cc/7GNP-KQP7]. This new requirement so
heavily impacted companies’ data collection practices that Meta, Facebook’s parent company,
estimated that it would cost the company $10 billion in ad revenue in 2022. See Coral Murphy
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Chrome browser to prohibit cookies that track browsing habits.21 Other
proposals attempt to solve the issue by making data more expensive.22 To
prevent harm, one narrow proposal entails levying “data taxes” to force
would-be collectors to take and use only the data they absolutely need.23 To
cure harm, other proposals prioritize punishing businesses that irresponsibly
handle data with heavy fines and/or criminal prosecution.24
One final class of proposals seeks to empower consumers directly by
establishing a property interest in data.25 Indeed, calls for “data dignity”
through ownership have grown to the point that data propertization—the
process of establishing a bundle of enforceable rights in data comparable to
those that comprise property interests—has become a key feature of at least
one presidential campaign,26 several private projects to create a better and
more inclusive internet,27 and the European legislative answer to the data
harms problem.28 After all, property rights naturally arise to cure issues in
social organization29 and to reverse economic externalities,30 all while
recognizing the role of ownership in natural law31 and personal identity.32
Accordingly, this Note champions data propertization as the proper
method for preventing and redressing data harms. In Part I, this Note
Marcos, Meta Plunges and Sets Off Wall Street’s Worst Drop in Nearly a Year, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 3, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/03/business/stock-market-today.html
[https://perma.cc/8YPH-GWT7].
21. See Megan Graham, Google Says It Won’t Use New Ways of Tracking You As It
Phases Out Browser Cookies for Ads, CNBC (Mar. 3, 2021, 9:02 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/03/google-says-it-wont-track-you-directly-in-the-future-asit-phases-out-cookies.html [https://perma.cc/L5LC-MWJ9].
22. Cf. Hirsch, supra note 19, at 458–59 (addressing the insufficiency of self-regulation).
23. See Ziva Rubinstein, Note, Taxing Big Data: A Proposal to Benefit Society for the
Use of Private Information, 31 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1199, 1238 (2021).
24. During the 2020 Democratic presidential primaries, for example, Senator Elizabeth
Warren argued that “[t]ech companies shouldn’t be using Americans’ private information for
profit.” Rani Molla & Emily Stewart, 2020 Democrats on Who Controls Your Data—and
Who’s at Fault When It’s Mishandled, VOX (Dec. 5, 2019, 4:11 PM), https://www.vox.com/
policy-and-politics/2019/12/3/20965463/tech-2020-candidate-policies-online-data-equifax
[https://perma.cc/XF5Q-9WEC]. Senator Warren further suggested that the failure to protect
Americans’ data should be met with fines or “expand[ed] criminal liability [for] any corporate
executive who negligently oversees a giant company causing severe harm to US families.” Id.
25. See, e.g., Jaron Lanier & E. Glen Weyl, A Blueprint for a Better Digital Society, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Sept. 26, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/a-blueprint-for-a-better-digital-society
[https://perma.cc/FM43-5B4P]; Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMMC’NS ACM,
Sept. 1996, at 92, 99–101; Sidi Mohamed Sidi Ahmed & Duryana Mohamed, Data in the
Internet of Things Era: The Propertization of Data in Light of Contemporary Business
Practices, 21 INT’L J. BUS. & SOC’Y 81, 91–92 (2020).
26. See, e.g., Data as a Property Right, YANG2020, https://www.yang2020.com/policies/
data-property-right/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/BB6G-MCML].
27. See, e.g., PROJECT LIBERTY, https://www.projectliberty.io [https://perma.cc/KZM2ZE4A]
(last
visited
Feb.
2,
2022);
DATA
DIVIDEND
PROJECT,
https://www.datadividendproject.com [https://perma.cc/RW9J-AWWE] (last visited Feb. 2,
2022).
28. See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing GDPR).
29. See infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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examines data propertization through the lens of data and property to build a
coherent understanding of how the two might and should work together.
Part I then provides an overview of the scholarship surrounding data
propertization.
In Part II, this Note examines recent data protection and privacy laws in
Illinois, California, Virginia, and Colorado to reveal the inescapable truth
that data propertization is already underway. In each case, state data privacy
law embraces and advances data propertization by (1) conferring a bundle of
rights to data that mirror emblematic property rights to possess, exclude, and
alienate and (2) establishing a framework for enforcement of those rights.
Consequently, this survey of legal regimes will provide a critical illustration
of the ways in which property interests are only as strong as the uniformity
in the rights granted and as robust as the enforcement mechanisms designed
to enforce them. Above all, Part II will illustrate that while these data privacy
laws individually embrace data propertization, differences between them
have exposed gaps in rights and enforcement which only fragment and
jeopardize data propertization.
Part III takes this lesson and addresses the fragmentation problem by
focusing on the harmonization imperative. Specifically, Part III.A argues
that a successful data propertization regime requires a uniform bundle of
rights and accordingly proposes a set of harmonized rights around which a
property interest in data should be built. Part III.B then argues that these data
property rights should be codified in federal law and dually enforced through
agency enforcement and a right of private action.
I. DATA, PROPERTY, AND DATA PROPERTIZATION
This Note begins with an analysis of data propertization through the lens
of data and property. Part I.A explores the unique characteristics that justify
tailored protections for data. Part I.B then illustrates why property law might
be well suited to providing such protection and examines how that protection
can and should be maintained. Part I.C concludes with a discussion of the
scholarship surrounding data propertization.
A. Data
Data is created whenever we interact with technology. 33 That is, using
Google Maps to navigate creates location data detailing where we have been
and how we got there,34 just as scrolling through TikTok creates engagement
data that the platform uses to attract advertisers.35 Once created, possession
of that data falls to the company that owns the technology that processes the

33. See Lanier & Weyl, supra note 25 (defining “data” as “most digital activity”).
34. See Google Maps Timeline, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/maps/answer/
6258979 [https://perma.cc/BR4U-8CGD] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
35. See Sara Morrison, TikTok Surprises Users by Making Personalized Ads Mandatory,
VOX (Mar. 16, 2021, 3:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/22334086/tiktok-privacypolicy-personalized-ads [https://perma.cc/7XTW-GVHP].
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data, rather than to the interacting party.36 As a result, individuals cannot see
the types and volume of data that they create, and most are unaware of their
digital footprint and the potential for harm arising from it.37 Most Facebook
users, for example, do not know that their data can be collected outside of
Facebook by entities other than Facebook through a program called Pixel.38
To compound this problem, data is becoming more and more difficult to track
in a world where international data flows are an increasingly important and
prevalent part of the global economy.39 Data knows no borders—to control
it, regulators must come to terms with the fact that the expanse of data that
individuals create may be larger and more diffuse than anyone may realize,
expect, or wish,40 leading to greater moral hazard concerns.41
Attempting to control data through the law also requires recognizing data’s
intangibility. As an intangible asset, data is non-rivalrous and excludable:
although multiple entities can simultaneously use the same piece of data
(which is thereby non-rivalrous), the right set of security protocols may
prevent others from accessing that data (which is thereby excludable).42 That
excludability, however, is far from absolute: because data is intangible, there
is little that can be done to prevent the proliferation of data once others gain

36. See Aziz Z. Huq, Who Owns Our Data?, BOS. REV. (Oct. 25, 2021),
https://bostonreview.net/articles/who-owns-our-data/ [https://perma.cc/V4UJ-YUB2] (“[I]t is
often hard to assign specific pieces of data to single individuals. The information produced
by social media platforms, in particular, is often relational: it captures the flow of interactions,
rather than something distinct about a single user.”).
37. See PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 9, at 27 (“Though many Americans feel their
activities are being tracked, online and off, by both companies and the government, very few
believe they understand what these entities are doing with the data being collected.”).
38. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook Will Now Show You Exactly How It Stalks You—
Even When You’re Not Using Facebook, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/28/off-facebook-activity-page/
[https://perma.cc/YQ8F-G3LX] (“It’s easy to forget in the constant barrage of Zuckerberg’s
privacy apologies and fines, but here’s the reality: Facebook keeps gathering more and more
data about us, with few laws restricting how it can use it.”); see also The Facebook Pixel,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/learn/facebook-ads-pixel [https://perma.cc/
7XKC-5GHF] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
39. See WORLD BANK GRP., DATA FOR BETTER LIVES 237 (2021).
40. See Laudon, supra note 25, at 96 (“Large-scale databases have become so ubiquitous
that individuals have no possibility of knowing all the database systems in which their personal
information appears.”).
41. “Moral hazard is a situation in which one party engages in risky behavior or fails to
act in good faith because it knows the other party bears the economic consequences of their
behavior.” Greg Depersio, What Are Examples of Moral Hazard in the Business World?,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 21, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040815/what-aresome-examples-moral-hazard-business-world.asp
[https://perma.cc/X3TB-ZC9M].
Businesses that hold data may be more willing to forego security investments or adopt riskier
data-handling practices to save on costs if the individuals associated with the data ultimately
bear the consequences of exfiltration or theft. Cf. infra note 89 (noting that businesses are
more likely to adopt measures that reduce the risk of data exfiltration or thefts if they bear the
cost of its consequences).
42. See CHRISTIAN RUSCHE & MARC SCHEUFEN, ON (INTELLECTUAL) PROPERTY AND
OTHER LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
12 (2018).
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access to it.43 The owner of a ring, for example, can exclude others from
using it by mere virtue of possessing the physical object, whereas a credit
card owner cannot exclude others from using the card beyond doing their best
to prevent the dissemination of the card’s number and expiration date. This
tension highlights the importance of controlling data at the earliest possible
stage—it would be better, after all, to prevent the dissemination of data rather
than to attempt to repatriate that data and its copies once they are let loose.
B. Property
That is where property comes in. According to Black’s Law Dictionary,
“property” is “[c]ollectively, the rights in a valued resource such as land,
chattel, or an intangible.”44 Under this “bundle of rights” definition of
property, a property interest includes not only the rights of ownership and
possession but also the rights to exclude and to alienate.45 A property interest
in land, for example, achieves much more than affirming one’s ties to a parcel
of land through ownership: it confers powers to dispose of the land at will
and to prohibit others from accessing it.46 This section explores how such a
property interest in data might arise, how it may be expanded, and how it
should be maintained.
1. Justifying Property
Property is so important that moral philosophers, political theorists, and
economists extol the rise of property rights as central to the development of
society and the rise of the modern state. Embracing natural law, John Locke
argued that a property interest is the just result of removing something from
its natural state and imbuing it with labor.47 Similarly, Professor Margaret
Jane Radin advances the view that property rights reflect one’s personhood:
“Most people possess certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves,”
objects that “are closely bound up with personhood because they are part of
the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the
world.”48 Accordingly, property provides keystone relational rights through
which individuals establish their identity and find their place in society.49

43. See Laudon, supra note 25, at 99 (“Once individuals lose control of information about
themselves and ownership of the information, the information is then used freely by other
institutions”); RUSCHE & SCHEUFEN, supra note 42, at 12 (describing the “information
paradox,” in which the seller of an intangible good must disclose the product to help the buyer
arrive at a price, but cannot thereafter exclude the buyer from the product).
44. Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
45. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746 (1917).
46. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1352–54 (1993).
47. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 111–12 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003).
48. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982).
49. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 70 (Allen W. Wood ed.,
H.B. Nisbet trans., 8th prtg. 2003) (“[I]t is only as owners of property that [two people] have
existence . . . for each other.”).
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Theories based in politics and economics shift the focus away from the
individual to reflect a systems-level view. While chronicling the origins of
political order, Francis Fukuyama posited that “[w]hen economists talk about
the rule of law, they are usually referring to modern property rights and
contract enforcement.”50 That is, the state arose as property law allowed it
to preempt conflict by encouraging parties to cooperate and bargain in
formalized and orderly markets.51 Then, as production functions and market
values began to change, property rights proved malleable in that they
provided a dynamic mechanism for reducing economic externalities as they
arose.52
According to Professor Harold Demsetz, property rights
systematically emerge “when the gains from propertization outweigh the
costs of securing those rights.”53
These justifications for property differ, but none are mutually exclusive of
the others. A property interest in land, for example, would arise under
Locke’s view by virtue of the possessor’s labor on it,54 under Professor
Radin’s view as an extension of the owner’s ties to the land,55 and under
Demsetz’s view as a way to maximize the growing benefits of varied land
use.56 Similarly, a property interest in data can be justified under Locke’s
view as the result of an individual’s interactions with technology;57 under
Professor Radin’s view as a way to recognize the digital extension of an
individual’s identity;58 and under Demsetz’s view as a way to eradicate the
harms of free access to data, which in aggregate now outweigh the costs of
propertization.59
2. Expanding and Maintaining Propertization
But how does property law accommodate such a transition from property
in land to property in data? With land, traditional property interests flow

50. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER:
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 248 (2011).

FROM PREHUMAN TIMES TO

51. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8–10 (1960)
(arguing that, absent transaction costs, private bargaining in the allocation of resources use
can overcome initial entitlements). See generally Stergios Skaperdas, Cooperation, Conflict,
and Power in the Absence of Property Rights, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 720 (1992) (exploring the
likelihood of cooperation or conflict in the absence of property rights).
52. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
350 (1967).
53. Steven H. Hazel, Personal Data as Property, 70 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1055, 1056 (2020).
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
58. See Tyler Reigeluth, Why Data Is Not Enough: Digital Traces as Control of Self and
Self-Control, 12 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 243, 249 (2014) (“[O]ur identities are collections of
digital traces”); Russell Belk, Extended Self and the Digital World, CURRENT OP. PSYCH., Aug.
2016, at 50, 50 (noting that current digital worlds “extend our identity beyond our mind and
body alone”).
59. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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seamlessly because every parcel is unique, rivalrous, and excludable.60
Physical occupation of land by one necessarily leads to exclusion of all
others, and alienation necessarily involves only that discrete parcel.
Intangibles like data, meanwhile, are easily duplicated, non-rivalrous, and
non-excludable.61 Thus, even if propertization established ownership, a
property interest in data would mean very little if other rights in the bundle
were not strong enough to prevent others from taking that data.62 If the novel
property interest is to survive the transition from propertizing tangibles to
propertizing intangibles, it therefore follows that the bundle of rights must be
reconfigured.63 New rules are needed precisely because physical property
rights are fundamentally different from data property rights and cannot
sufficiently protect against a new category of the associated intangible harms.
In so doing, crafting a strong right to exclude is essential because it lies at
the core of every property interest.64 In the case of data, “the strength of an
owner’s right to exclude must reflect the strength of the privacy interest she
seeks to protect”65 because determining the appropriate scope of property
protection requires taking privacy interests into account.66 In other words, a
property interest in data would require a strong right to exclude in the first
instance because it encapsulates an individual’s digital personhood and
therefore implicates a strong privacy interest.67 The strength of the right to
exclude can thereafter be adjusted to reflect a spectrum of privacy interests
in different types of data.68
60. See Ellickson, supra note 46, at 1322 (“Private property conventionally refers to a
regime in which no more than a small number of persons have access to a resource.”); James
Chen, Private Good, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/private-good.asp
[https://perma.cc/BL4N-5AVU] (Jan. 5, 2021) (defining “private goods” as “rivalrous and
excludable”).
61. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
62. Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 615 (1962) (“[T]here is a fundamental paradox in the determination of demand
for information; its value for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then
he has in effect acquired it without cost. Of course, if the seller can retain property rights in
the use of the information, this would be no problem.”).
63. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1890) (“Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new rights,
and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”); Demsetz,
supra note 52, at 354–59 (discussing examples where property interests must shift to
accommodate shifting externalities); see also Laudon, supra note 25, at 102 (“Property law is
quite flexible in recognizing value in a variety of tangible and intangible assets . . . .”).
64. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
744 (1998) (“[I]f we start with the right to exclude, it is possible with very minor clarifications
to derive deductively the other major incidents that have been associated with property.”); see
also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Privacy Interest in Property, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 869, 916 (2019).
65. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 64, at 916.
66. Id. at 920.
67. See supra note 58; supra note 48 and accompanying text.
68. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 63, at 215 (“Any rule of liability adopted must
have in it an elasticity which shall take account of the varying circumstances of each
case . . . .”). Indeed, empirical data suggests that Americans place varying degrees of
importance on keeping data private, depending on the type(s) and purpose(s) for which it is
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Similarly, bailments69 in data must come with a duty of care so that entities
who possess others’ data are made responsible for the costs of potential
harm.70 This duty of care must likewise remain flexible depending on the
privacy interest at stake: it may require nothing more than the adoption of
responsible data-handling practices,71 or it may be strict to the point of
requiring “information fiduciaries” to affirmatively act in data owners’ best
interests.72 In either case, a bailor’s scope of consent is necessarily central
to what bailees may do with borrowed data, when they can do it, and to what
extent they may do it.73
Once the metes and bounds of a property interest are established,
monitoring whether individuals respect or violate others’ property rights is
key to maintaining the underlying interest because property is a law of
relations.74 Where a right in one creates a duty in another, protecting a
property interest requires not only the preservation of rights but also the
corroboration that duties correlative to those rights are adequately
collected. See Venky Anant et al., The Consumer-Data Opportunity and the Privacy
Imperative, MCKINSEY & CO. exhibit 2 (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/risk-and-resilience/our-insights/the-consumer-data-opportunity-and-the-privacyimperative [https://perma.cc/R8K4-LFWJ]; PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 9, at 34.
69. A bailment is “[a] delivery of personal property by one person (the bailor) to another
(the bailee) who holds the property for a certain purpose, usu[ally] under an express or
implied-in-fact contract.” Bailment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
70. See JEAN TIROLE, ECONOMICS FOR THE COMMON GOOD 404 (Steven Rendall trans.,
2017) (“In general, any company that collects data should be at least partly responsible for any
harmful use subsequently made of it by others, whether they obtained it directly or
indirectly.”); see also PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 9, at 4 (“[M]ajorities of the public are not
confident that corporations are good stewards of the data they collect.”).
71. Many organizations that specialize in data storage offer responsible data handling
guides. See, e.g., Data Privacy Best Practices for Organizations, IRON MOUNTAIN,
https://www.ironmountain.com/resources/general-articles/d/data-privacy-best-practices-fororganizations [https://perma.cc/3PJD-38BG] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022); Big Data Security and
Privacy Handbook: 100 Best Practices in Big Data Security and Privacy, IAPP,
https://iapp.org/resources/article/big-data-security-and-privacy-handbook-100-bestpractices-in-big-data-security-and-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/JRM2-3UZK] (last visited Feb.
2, 2022).
72. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1183, 1209 (2016). But see Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of
Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019) (arguing that establishing information
fiduciaries would create more problems than it purports to solve).
73. See Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 401, 404 (2003) (“When the law enforces a right as a right in rem, consent of the right
holder is required for the right to be affected, that is, damaged, in any way.”); see also Laudon,
supra note 25, at 99 (“Privacy invasion occurs whenever personal information of any kind is
obtained and used without the consent of the individual.”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as
Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 559, 598
(2015) (“Data gathering, aggregation, categorization, and subsequent disclosure to third
parties . . . may be perceived as an invasion of our privacy because the subsequent actions
taken with our data violate the expectations we had of the behavior of third parties in whom
we entrusted our data.”).
74. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 531, 544–45 (2005) (“[Hohfeld] . . . elucidated that the crux of property is not a
relationship between a person and an object, as Blackstone had suggested, but rather a nexus
of legal relationships among people regarding an object.”).

2022]

ON THE PROPERTIZATION OF DATA

1711

performed.75 Violations must therefore be corrected in actions brought by
the state to enforce the interest itself,76 or in actions brought by private
individuals to enforce their moral rights.77 Note that these avenues for
correction serve distinct yet complementary goals: state enforcement
corrects societal harms by enforcing property interests in explicit terms at the
lowest cost,78 whereas private enforcement allows individuals to seek redress
for moral wrongs without resorting to self-help79 or ceding control of relief.80
A property interest is therefore only as strong as the enforcement mechanisms
designed to protect it.81
C. Data Propertization
Having explored data propertization through the lens of data and property,
this Note now turns to a discussion of the scholarship surrounding data
propertization as a concept in its own right. Would it effectively prevent and
cure data harms?
1. The Case for Data Propertization
Some say yes. Nobel Prize–winning economist Jean Tirole advises that
the “acceptability of digitization depends on us believing that our data will
not be used against us, [and] that the online platforms we use will respect the
terms of our contract with them.”82 In other words, digitization “is based on

75. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 31 (1913) (describing duty as the “invariable correlative”
of right).
76. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) (“Having
made its initial choice, society must enforce that choice. Simply setting the entitlement does
not avoid the problem of ‘might makes right’; a minimum of state intervention is always
necessary.”); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 74, at 560 (“[I]n most cases, the enforcement
of property rights is a public good that the state should centrally provide.”).
77. See Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1873, 1907 (2011) (“Because the state frequently requires individuals to give up their
extra-legal enforcement rights, the state provides a private right of action . . . for the plaintiff
to enforce her moral rights.”).
78. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 74, at 561–62.
79. See Gold, supra note 77, at 1907–08.
80. See id. at 1912.
81. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 64, at 733 (“Given that property is a norm, there is also
a consensus that property cannot exist without some institutional structure that stands ready to
enforce it.”); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 74, at 555 (“Without enforcement, one’s status
as owner has little independent meaning.”); Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J.
502, 518 (1924) (“Inasmuch as the existence of jural right and duty means nothing except that
organized society affords a systematic remedy or remedies through its judicial and its
executive or administrative officers, legislative action that abolishes all remedy and all
sanction also abolishes the right and the duty.”).
82. TIROLE, supra note 70, at 402.
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trust.”83 And yet, a look back at the harms in this Note’s introduction shows
that mere trust cannot prevent harm.84
The case for data propertization holds that creating property rights in data
would preempt the trust issue by narrowing choice and empowering
consumers. It forces parties to work around clear property entitlements such
that when data belongs to the individual, collectors must work around that
owner’s preferences and priorities to gain access to it.85 As a result, owners’
“attention will be guided by their self-defined interests rather than by
manipulative platforms beholden to advertisers or other third parties.”86
Uniformity breeds empowerment, too: coherence and consistency in data
propertization regimes may save individuals from an endless barrage of
privacy policies by allowing them to assert an enduring say in the fate of their
data wherever they go.87 Meanwhile, a property interest in data would force
businesses to more carefully adhere to the duties that attach to data in their
possession so that they do not become the subject of costly enforcement
actions.88 As a result, data propertization paves the way for increased
security investments that reduce the likelihood of breaches89 such that
individuals can worry less about potential harms downstream.90
Most importantly, data propertization is arguably the most effective
avenue for preventing data harms and correcting them if they occur anyway.
Though property’s first-order goal is to promote consensual transactions and
prevent trespass,91 the law provides remedies for harm if it occurs anyway.92
83. Id.; see also Waldman, supra note 73, at 561 (“[W]hat makes expectations of privacy
reasonable are expectations of trust.”).
84. See Hirsch, supra note 19, at 458 (noting that, according to critics of self-regulation,
“self-regulatory standards will inevitably prove too lenient”).
85. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 76, at 1092 (“An entitlement is protected by a
property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder
must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed
upon by the seller . . . . [This form of entitlement] lets each of the parties say how much the
entitlement is worth to him, and gives the seller a veto if the buyer does not offer enough.”).
86. Lanier & Weyl, supra note 25; see also WILLIAM L. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 22 (2004) (“Markets and property
rights go hand in hand. Property rights provide the basic incentives for private economic
activity and the starting point for transactions whereby resources are shifted to their most
valuable use.”).
87. See Hazel, supra note 53, at 1075 (“[T]he specific rights in the bundle do not
matter . . . . What does matter is that the same bundle always accompanies personal data. So
long as data subjects understand that standard bundle, they will rarely need to examine privacy
policy language. As a result, data subjects would understand the property interest transferred
when they use websites—without reviewing hundreds of privacy policies.”).
88. See Gianclaudio Malgieri, “Ownership” of Customer (Big) Data in the European
Union: Quasi-Property as Comparative Solution?, J. INTERNET L., Nov. 2016, at 3, 6 (“If
personal data is ‘paid’ for by data users, companies may be incentivized to turn more attention
to protecting personal data from data breach or negligent disclosure.”).
89. See TIROLE, supra note 70, at 404 (“Companies do invest large sums in online security
to avert reputational damage, but would invest much more if they fully internalized the cost
of such security breaches to their customers.”).
90. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
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Judge Guido Calabresi and Professor Douglas Melamed argue that where
prospective property rules fail to prevent harm, court-imposed liability-rule
injunctions can cure them.93 And when party price determinations under a
property rule and injunctive relief under a liability rule prove insufficient to
cure harm, Professor Paul Schwartz argues that damages awards should be
made available, too.94 With strong, harmonized entitlements95 and robust
avenues for relief,96 data propertization stands ready to protect data on all
fronts.97
2. The Case Against Data Propertization
On the other side of the coin, the case against data propertization dismisses
the solution as too costly.98 For example, propertization requires systematic
and costly publication of the interest so that others are aware that it exists.99
Moreover, the costs of notice and of negotiating and obtaining consent for
each transaction may far exceed the potential benefits of possessing the

93. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 76, at 1093 (“It should be clear that most
entitlements to most goods are mixed. Taney’s house may be protected by a property rule in
situations where Marshall wishes to purchase it [and] by a liability rule where the government
decides to take it by eminent domain . . . .”); id. at 1092 n.7 (arguing that property entitlements
that require excessive state intervention become too costly to enforce via property rules and
will eventually be enforced by easily administered liability rules instead).
94. See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2056, 2108–09 (2004).
95. See supra notes 63–73 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
97. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 63, at 211 (“The right of property in its widest
sense, including all possession, including all rights and privileges, and hence embracing the
right to an inviolate personality, affords alone that broad basis upon which the protection
which the individual demands can be rested.”).
98. See, e.g., Lothar Determann, No One Owns Data, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 43 (2018)
(“New property rights in data are not suited to promote better privacy or more innovation or
technological advances, but would more likely suffocate free speech, information freedom,
science, and technological progress.”). Under Demsetz’s theory of propertization, a property
right will not arise if its costs outweigh its benefits. See Demsetz, supra note 52, at 348.
99. See Arruñada, supra note 73, at 412 (arguing that exchanges of property must be
publicized so the interest remains enforceable against potential future buyers and lenders);
Schwartz, supra note 94, at 2098 (noting that a critical condition of data propertization is “that
third parties must be able to verify that a given piece of personal information has in fact been
propertized and then identify the specific rules that apply to it”); Lanier & Weyl, supra note
25 (noting that “manag[ing] data provenance, access, and flow [is] the first step in managing
its value”).
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data.100 At least one economist argues that this increase in transaction costs
can counterproductively weaken the property interest in the long run.101
Other critics emphasize that data propertization would hamper value
creation and the free flow of information,102 as granting expansive rights to
exclude erroneously assumes that individuals get no value for data they
provide. That assumption is unfounded, they argue: “[B]usinesses can often
argue that they have spent money to acquire our data” because “[w]e provide
our personal data in exchange either for useful services (search engines,
social networks, instant messaging, online video, maps, email) or in the
course of a commercial transaction (as in the case of Uber and Airbnb).”103
In reality, we are not Spotify or Facebook’s customers but their transacting
partners in exchanges where we obtain valuable services by paying for them
with our data.104 Those who are unaware of this dynamic and prevent
companies from accessing their data anyway undermine long-established
practices—to put it harshly, consumers may not deserve a property interest
in their data because they are ignorant of or do not care about how their data
is exchanged and monetized in the first place.105
Lastly, justice-seeking critics note that data propertization would lead to
commodification that exploits those who have no choice but to “click away
rights to data in exchange for convenience, free services, connection,

100. LARRY DOWNES, A RATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PRIVACY “CRISIS” 19 (2013)
(“Transaction costs higher than the value of the transaction put an end to the hopes for a market
for any kind of property, private or otherwise.”). But see Daniel Susser, Notice After
Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy Disclosures Are Valuable Even If Consent Frameworks
Aren’t, 9 J. INFO. POL’Y 37 (2019) (noting that critics of notice-and-consent regimes “say little
about the value of notice” and arguing that “[w]e ought to decouple notice from consent, and
imagine notice serving other normative ends besides readying people to make informed
consent decisions”).
101. See Carmine Guerriero, Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and the Limits of the
Market 4 (Quaderni DSE, Working Paper No. 1110, 2021) (“[P]roperty rights are optimally
weakened when transaction costs are sizable and more so the larger are the impediments to
negotiation.”). But see Laudon, supra note 25, at 103 (“Under a regime in which individuals
own their personal information, transaction costs may rise but only as far as necessary to pay
for the cost of invading privacy.”).
102. See, e.g., Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, Jr., Why Data Ownership Is the Wrong
Approach
to
Protecting
Privacy,
BROOKINGS INST.
(June
26,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/06/26/why-data-ownership-is-the-wrongapproach-to-protecting-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/K27W-YEWM] (“Treating personal
information as property to be licensed or sold may induce people to trade away their privacy
rights for very little value while injecting enormous friction into free flow of information.”).
103. TIROLE, supra note 70, at 408.
104. See Will Oremus, Are You Really the Product?, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:55 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/04/are-you-really-facebooks-product-the-history-of-adangerous-idea.html [https://perma.cc/X4JX-4LYH].
105. See Kerry & Morris, supra note 102 (“The current notice-and-choice model is failing
because it is effectively impossible for users to understand either how their data will be used
or the accompanying privacy risks, especially in the constant flow of online engagement in
today’s connected world.”); Schwartz, supra note 94, at 2078 (“Consumer ignorance leads to
a data market in which one set of parties does not even know that ‘negotiating’ is taking place.
Even if there is a sense that some personal data are collected, many individuals do not know
how or whether this information is further processed and shared.”).
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endorphins or other motivations,”106 if not incentivize entrepreneurial
litigation that would flood the courts with unmeritorious claims.107 These
concerns are all valid, but unfortunately, the discussion of whether to
propertize data has long expired: in the European Union and in some
jurisdictions in the United States, data propertization is already underway.
3. Data Propertization 101: The European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation
The European Union kickstarted the process of data propertization with its
2016 data protection and privacy law, the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR).108 Though it flies under the banner of data protection
and privacy, GDPR advances data propertization by conferring a bundle of
rights in data that mirror the property rights to possess, exclude, and alienate.
Specifically, the right to possess is furthered by GDPR’s grant of a consumer
right to be informed of and access collected data,109 the right to exclude is
furthered by GDPR’s right to erasure and right to restrict processing,110 and
the right to alienate is furthered by GDPR’s right to data portability.111
Violations of these rights are then punishable by the imposition of costly
administrative fines.112 As recommended earlier, GDPR advances data
propertization by granting property-based rights113 and backing them up with
robust enforcement.114
When it passed, GDPR was celebrated as “an ambitious achievement” set
to become “the privacy lodestar for the foreseeable future.”115
Commentators cite to the law as a prime example of the “Brussels Effect,” a
process of regulatory globalization through which the EU “externalize[s] its
laws and regulations outside its borders.”116 In other words, although EU

106. Christopher Tonetti & Cameron F. Kerry, Should Consumers Be Able to Sell Their
Own Personal Data?, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
should-consumers-be-able-to-sell-their-own-personal-data-11570971600
[https://perma.cc/2HH6-VB5S]; see also Kerry & Morris, supra note 102 (“Basing privacy
protection on property systems, on the other hand, would reduce privacy to a commodity,
double down on a transactional model based on consumer choice, and be enormously
complicated to implement.”); Laudon, supra note 25, at 101–02 (“[S]ome people will sell their
privacy, the poor more than the rich.”).
107. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
108. Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
109. See id. arts. 13–15.
110. See id. arts. 17–19.
111. See id. art. 20.
112. What Are the GDPR Fines?, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/fines/ [https://perma.cc/
ZFQ8-Q9SW] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
113. See supra notes 63–73 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
115. Jennifer Dumas, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Prioritizing
Resources, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1115, 1127 (2019); see also Anant et al., supra note 68
(calling GDPR “a bellwether for data-privacy regulation”).
116. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012). The Brussels
Effect is a spin-off of the California Effect, a term coined by David Vogel to describe the
state’s ability to set strict consumer and environmental regulation standards for the entire
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regulations technically only apply to member states, they are nonetheless so
expansive in applicability that they effectively impose EU law on other
countries such as the United States.117 In the next part, this Note will
illustrate that data protection and privacy laws in the United States adopt a
similar approach to data propertization, leading to distinct and novel
standard-setting effects.
II. DATA PROPERTIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The inescapable truth is that data propertization is already underway in the
United States. In this part, an examination of state privacy laws will show
that the process of data propertization has already begun in Illinois,
California, Virginia, and Colorado under the banner of data protection and
privacy. An analysis of each state’s data protection regime will highlight
three important lessons. First, like with GDPR, the bundle of rights granted
under each law establishes a property interest in data because they mirror the
emblematic rights to possess, exclude, and alienate that together make up
traditional property interests. Second, this property interest—no matter how
strong or expansive the ensuing rights may be—is only as strong as the
enforcement mechanisms designed to protect it. Third, and most
importantly, while data privacy laws in Illinois, California, Virginia, and
Colorado individually embrace data propertization, differences between the
four laws have exposed gaps in rights and enforcement, which only fragment
and jeopardize data propertization writ large.
A. Illinois: The Biometric Information Privacy Act
Illinois embraced GDPR’s rights-heavy model of data propertization a full
decade before GDPR came into effect, and it did so with one of the first laws
in the United States to respond to the new age of data harms. The Illinois
Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA),118 unanimously passed in
2008,119 was a landmark law enacted to protect consumer biometric data120
through increased regulation.121 BIPA was the Illinoisan response to the
uneasiness and anger that arose when private entities went bankrupt without
indicating whether they would delete or sell off the data in their

United States. See id. at 5; DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 248–70 (1995).
117. See generally Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data
Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365 (2019).
118. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1–99 (2021).
119. See 2008 Ill. Laws 3693; Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), ACLU ILL.,
https://www.aclu-il.org/en/campaigns/biometric-information-privacy-act-bipa
[https://perma.cc/3V5H-TNJ6] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
120. BIPA specifically protects “biometric identifiers,” which are defined as including “a
retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.” 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 14/10 (2021).
121. See id. 14/5(g) (“The public welfare, security, and safety will be served by regulating
the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric
identifiers and information.”).
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possession.122 By establishing a bundle of rights to an individual’s biometric
data and imposing duties upon entities that deal with that data, BIPA
effectively establishes a property interest in biometric data. As the Illinois
chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union asserts: “A person’s biometric
information belongs to them, and only them.”123
1. Rights and Duties
BIPA recognizes the irreversibility of trespassory data harms124 by placing
the right to exclude at the very center of the property interest in biometric
data.125 Specifically, section 15(b) prohibits the collection, capture,
purchase, and receipt of another’s biometric data without their informed
consent.126 This gatekeeping exclusion is further bolstered by section 15(c),
which wholly prohibits the subsequent sale, lease, and trade of biometric
data.127 Under section 15(d), even a profitless disclosure or dissemination of
data requires separate consent.128 Through a default blanket prohibition on
the use of others’ biometric data, these provisions empower data owners to
assert the value of their data and regulate its use on their own terms.129
But the duties do not end there. Where sections 15(b), (c), and (d) establish
direct duties between owners and collecting entities, sections 15(a) and (e)
impose general duties that collecting entities owe to all data owners.130
Section 15(a) imposes a duty on all entities that retain, collect, or disclose
biometric data to publicly disclose a policy that “establish[es] a retention
schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and
biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining
such identifiers or information has been satisfied.”131 In the meantime,
section 15(e) requires entities to “store, transmit, and protect from disclosure
all biometric identifiers and biometric information using the reasonable
standard of care within the private entity’s industry.”132 These duties
effectively restrict collecting entities to activities within an owner’s original

122. See Rivera v. Google, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1098 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
123. See Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), supra note 119.
124. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c) (2021) (“[S]ocial security numbers, when
compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the individual;
therefore, once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity
theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions.”).
125. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
126. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2021); id. 14/10 (defining the requisite “[w]ritten
release” as “informed written consent”).
127. Id. 14/15(c).
128. Id. 14/15(d).
129. See supra note 85; Schwartz, supra note 94, at 2103 (“An opt-in rule forces the data
processor to obtain consent to acquire, use, and transfer personal information. It creates an
entitlement in personal information and places pressure on the data collector to induce the
individual to surrender it.”).
130. For more on the distinction between duties owed to specific people and those owed to
an indefinite class, see Hohfeld, supra note 45, at 718.
131. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a) (2021).
132. Id. 14/15(e)(1).
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scope of consent133 and impose a requirement that they act as responsible
custodians of the biometric data in their possession,134 thus reducing moral
hazard concerns.135
2. Enforcement
BIPA concretizes these rights through strong enforcement mechanisms.
Under section 20, any prevailing party “aggrieved by a violation” of the law
can obtain, “for each violation,” up to $1000 in liquidated damages for a
negligent violation and up to $5000 for an intentional or reckless violation.136
Although BIPA allows prevailing plaintiffs to recover actual damages, 137 the
baseline availability of liquidated damages creates a strong incentive for
businesses to adhere to BIPA’s provisions at all costs since plaintiffs—now
theoretically free from the burden of proving actual damages to recover—
may find it easier to litigate these claims.138
This dynamic led to “one [of] the largest settlements ever for a privacy
violation” in In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litigation.139 In
that case, plaintiffs alleged that, as part of its “Tag Suggestions” photo
program, Facebook collected and stored user facial scans without notice or
consent, thus violating BIPA sections 15(a) and 15(b).140 Rather than go to
trial, the parties agreed to a $650 million settlement that put “at least $345
into the hands of every class member interested in being compensated.”141
Facebook additionally agreed to turn its facial recognition features off by
default globally, to publicly disclose how it intends to use facial data moving
forward, and to delete all existing and stored facial data for class members
who did not opt in to the feature.142 BIPA thus paved the way for the
plaintiffs to be directly compensated for the alleged harms and more broadly
forced the allegedly violating party to comply with the law moving forward.
In short, BIPA served to compensate for past harms and to prevent new ones
all in one go.143

133. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. For example, BIPA would prevent
bankrupt companies from selling off biometric data in their possession to satisfy creditors. See
supra note 122 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 41.
136. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2021).
137. See id.
138. See Schwartz, supra note 94, at 2083 (“Permitting liquidated damages . . . encourages
litigation, the specter of which may deter infringements of privacy. It will also allow others
who are not parties to the litigation to benefit from improved privacy practices that follow
successful litigation.”).
139. 522 F. Supp. 3d. 617, 620 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
140. See id. at 621.
141. Id. at 620.
142. See id. at 622.
143. Facebook ultimately announced on November 2, 2021, that it would shut down its
facial recognition software entirely. See Jerome Pesenti, An Update on Our Use of Face
Recognition, META (Nov. 2, 2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/11/update-on-use-offace-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/KX8W-9HNK].
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Indeed, the strength of BIPA’s design has only been confirmed by the
litigation it enabled. In Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.,144 the
Illinois Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in which it ruled that state
claims under BIPA did not require a concrete and individualized injury in
fact to survive a motion to dismiss.145 According to the court, only a
technical, textual injury in law was required to maintain a cause of action
because “[t]o require individuals to wait until they have sustained some
compensable injury beyond violation of their statutory rights before they may
seek recourse . . . would be completely antithetical to the Act’s preventative
and deterrent purposes.”146 This ruling led to an explosion in BIPA claims
driven by plaintiffs eager to assert their newfound property interests in
biometric data.147
3. Moving Forward
BIPA’s provisions methodically establish a property interest in biometric
data by defining biometric data as a discrete object, vesting a bundle of rights
in that data, and providing a mechanism for enforcing those rights. The
strength of this design has led to what may well become the “Illinois Effect”
in data regulation.148 BIPA litigation has already cropped up across the
country, tackling technologies that use biometrics to unlock devices149 or to
identify race, gender, and ethnicity.150 If BIPA litigation continues on its
trajectory,151 it is likely that private entities will take a greater initiative to
honor their data obligations to protect individuals’ biometric data.152
144.
145.
146.
147.

129 N.E. 3d 1197 (Ill. 2019).
Id. at 1207.
Id.
See Sara Merken, Surge in Biometric Privacy Suits Causes Firms to Boost Specialty,
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 14, 2019, 4:45 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-andpractice/surge-in-biometric-privacy-suits-causes-firms-to-boost-specialty
[https://perma.cc/PHT8-VJVA].
148. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
149. See generally Complaint, Barnett v. Apple, No. 2021CH03119 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct.
Ill. June 25, 2021); Celeste Bott, Apple Hit with Biometric Suit over Products’ ID Features,
LAW360 (June 30, 2021, 7:51 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1399198/apple-hitwith-biometric-suit-over-products-id-features [https://perma.cc/54JP-45EB].
150. See generally Third Amended Class Action Complaint, Vance v. Int’l Bus. Machines
Corp., No. 20-cv-00577 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2020); Complaint, Vance v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. 20-cv-01082 (W.D. Wash. July 14, 2020).
151. This trajectory is far from guaranteed. A recent pair of bills before the Illinois
legislature proposes BIPA amendments that would gut the law by weakening its core features
and superseding landmark district court and state court interpretations thus far. See ACLU
Warns That Illinois Privacy Rights at Risk This Week, ACLU ILL. (Mar. 8, 2021, 7:15 AM),
https://www.aclu-il.org/en/news/aclu-warns-illinois-privacy-rights-risk-week
[https://perma.cc/L6GG-8JJ3].
152. See supra note 138; see also Michael McMahon, Note, Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act Litigation in Federal Courts: Evaluating the Standing Doctrine in Privacy
Contexts, 65 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 897, 939–40 (2021) (“Especially in class action suits that can
add up to actual and meaningful penalties (or, at least, large settlements) for companies that
use biometrics, BIPA’s monetary penalties may spur such companies to be more careful in
their biometric collection and use.”). Alternatively, those who prefer not to enact such
measures can opt out of dealing in biometric data entirely. For example, “[o]ne practical effect
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B. California: The California Consumer Privacy Act
Next in the data propertization story is the California Consumer Privacy
Act (CCPA).153 Like BIPA, CCPA was enacted in response to a data crisis—
this time the Cambridge Analytica scandal.154 When it unanimously passed
in 2018,155 it was heralded as “one of the most significant regulations
overseeing the data-collection practices of technology companies in the
United States.”156 California voters took this legacy one step further in
November 2020, when they approved Proposition 24 to enact the California
Privacy Rights Act (CPRA),157 which strengthened key features of CCPA by
amendment.158 This section will show that, both in its original and
as-amended forms, CCPA takes a substantial step toward propertizing a
wider range of data through a more comprehensive set of rights and duties.
1. Rights and Duties
CCPA creates property interests in a wider swath of data than BIPA by
covering all “[p]ersonal [i]nformation,” which is defined as “information that
identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated
with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular
consumer or household.”159 The law only contains exceptions for data that
is publicly available,160 anonymized or aggregated,161 or regulated by federal
law.162 Indeed, it goes so far as to grant property interests in data such as
social security numbers,163 email addresses,164 records of products or
of BIPA is that Google’s Nest security cameras do not offer in Illinois a feature for recognizing
familiar faces.” Shira Ovide, The Best Law You’ve Never Heard Of, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/technology/the-best-law-youve-neverheard-of.html [https://perma.cc/A9WQ-YUV6].
153. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100 (West 2021).
154. See supra notes 13, 122 and accompanying text; Anupam Chander et al., Catalyzing
Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1781–84 (2021); Nicholas Confessore, The Unlikely
Activists Who Took on Silicon Valley—and Won, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/magazine/facebook-google-privacy-data.html
[https://perma.cc/PX4H-G98J].
155. See 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807; Issie Lapowsky, California Unanimously Passes Historic
Privacy Bill, WIRED (June 28, 2018, 5:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/californiaunanimously-passes-historic-privacy-bill [https://perma.cc/6TZS-XGFP].
156. Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/californiaonline-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/HH85-EV8A].
157. See 2020 California Proposition 24 (approved Nov. 3, 2020).
158. See Cameron F. Kerry & Caitlin Chin, By Passing Proposition 24, California Voters
Up the Ante on Federal Privacy Law, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/11/17/by-passing-proposition-24-californiavoters-up-the-ante-on-federal-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/DD52-4MCT].
159. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2021). Compare this with BIPA, which only
protects biometric data. See supra note 120.
160. See id. § 1798.140(o)(2).
161. See id. § 1798.140(o)(3).
162. See id. § 1798.145(c).
163. See id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(A).
164. See id.
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services purchased,165 internet activity,166 and inferences that may be drawn
from that data.167 CCPA furthers data propertization by coupling this broad
coverage with a set of six rights that mirror the traditional property rights of
possession, exclusion, and alienability.
Beginning with possessory rights, CCPA confers Californians with a right
to know and a right to access.168 Under section 110, data collection is subject
to a consumer’s right to know—that is, seek disclosure of the types and
specific pieces of data collected, sources from which they were collected, and
the purposes for such collection.169 Section 115, in turn, subjects the
subsequent sale or disclosure of data to a third party to a consumer’s right to
know the categories of data sold and the categories of third parties
involved.170 In all cases, CCPA requires that consumers have a right to
access the specific pieces of data collected,171 limits data collection to its
original stated purpose unless notice is provided,172 and prohibits the sale of
data by third parties unless a consumer has been given notice and an
opportunity to opt out of that sale.173 These primary rights—to know and to
access—function as possessory rights in data in that they identify the data in
which the property interest lies, then consolidate ownership into a controlled,
finite set by limiting any further collection, sale, or disclosure.174
The next two rights—the right to delete and the right to opt out—are
exclusionary rights. Under section 105, businesses must comply with
consumer requests to delete consumer data.175 Similarly, section 120(a)
empowers consumers to preemptively opt out of the sale and sharing of their

165. See id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(D).
166. See id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(F).
167. See id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(K).
168. See id. § 1798.100(a).
169. See id. § 1798.110(a).
170. See id. § 1798.115(a).
171. See id. §§ 1798.110(a)(5), 1798.100.
172. See id. § 1798.100(b).
173. See id. § 1798.115(d).
174. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of preventing
the uncontrolled proliferation of data).
175. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(c) (West 2021).
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data to third parties.176 Save for a few exceptions,177 these rights enable
consumers to enforce property interests in their data by excluding others from
possession.178 Note, however, that consumers are still not able to wholly opt
out of collection in the first instance. In contrast with BIPA, CCPA does not
impose an informed consent regime and allows businesses to collect and use
data as long as they disclose the nature of that collection and use.179 CPRA
amended CCPA to establish greater protections for “sensitive” personal
information,180 but even those protections only allow consumers to limit the
use of sensitive personal information to an enumerated set of “business
purpose” uses.181 Nevertheless, by granting a more encompassing set of
exclusionary rights to a narrow category of sensitive data, CCPA’s dual
categorization recognizes that trespasses to certain types of data lead to a
greater degree of harm and thus warrant a greater degree of protection.182
But beyond this narrow exception, CCPA’s propertization regime generally
vests the initial entitlement in the collecting business rather than in
consumers, and exclusion only occurs when consumers later choose to take
affirmative steps to protect their digital property.183
The final duo of rights are alienability rights flowing from the rights to
portability and nondiscrimination. Section 100(d) provides the first by
requiring businesses to deliver requested data “in a portable and, to the extent
technically feasible, readily useable format that allows the consumer to
transmit this information to another entity without hindrance.”184 Section
176. See id. § 1798.120(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2023). CCPA’s original opt-out right only
protected against the sale of consumer data. See 2018 Cal. Stat. 1807, 1811. CPRA extended
the opt-out right to exclude the sharing of data and address a loophole whereby entities could
disregard a consumer’s opt-out choice by essentially delaying payments for data. More
specifically, the loophole allowed companies to sell data to third parties by charging them for
advertising based on that data rather than the data itself—that is, by charging for the service
instead of the product itself. See Patience Haggin, Facebook Won’t Change Web Tracking in
Response to California Privacy Law, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019, 1:29 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wont-change-web-tracking-in-response-tocalifornia-privacy-law-11576175345 [https://perma.cc/9PGB-CXLZ] (“Facebook stated its
data collection qualified for the law’s exemption for sending data to ‘service providers’ and
didn’t count as a ‘sale’ of data under the law”). Because CPRA defines “sharing” broadly to
the point of covering any type of transfer, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(ah)(1) (West 2021)
(effective Jan. 1, 2023), its opt-out right closes that loophole and empowers consumers to
place a more encompassing bar on derivative transfers of their data.
177. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d) (West 2021).
178. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
179. Compare 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2021), with CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100(b),
1798.130 (West 2021).
180. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(ae) (West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023) (defining
“[s]ensitive personal information”).
181. See id. §§ 1798.135(f), 1798.140(e) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
182. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
183. This is only the case for data regarding adults. Known as the right to opt in, section
120(c) imposes a special restriction on the sale and sharing of data on children younger than
sixteen years old: a business must receive the affirmative consent of the consumer (or their
parents, in the case of children younger than thirteen years old) before engaging in such
activity. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(c) (West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
184. Id. § 1798.100(d).
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125, in turn, protects consumer choice through a right to nondiscrimination,
which prohibits businesses from denying, charging different prices or rates
for, or otherwise providing a different level or quality of, goods or services
to any consumer who chooses to exercise any rights under CCPA.185 A news
website that collects browsing data on its users, for example, may not block
access to its articles if an individual chooses to opt out of the sale of that data
to third parties.186 These two final rights protect a consumer’s alienation
decisions and accordingly complete the bundle of rights inherent in CCPA.
2. Enforcement
But of course, a property interest is only as strong as the enforcement
mechanisms that serve to protect it.187 In this regard, CCPA starts out strong:
on the front end, CCPA protects property interests by prospectively
invalidating contract provisions that “waive or limit” the rights it establishes,
reasoning that such a bargain would be “contrary to public policy.”188 On
the back end, CCPA protects those property rights through a robust
regulatory framework that clarifies and reinforces businesses’ obligations
under the law.189 For example, CCPA requires businesses to establish and
maintain processes through which consumers can submit CCPA requests,190
but it is the law’s implementing regulations that provide guidance on how to
process consumer requests,191 enumerate the types of notice that must be
provided,192 and lay out the exact elements of a CCPA-compliant privacy
policy.193
More significantly, CCPA establishes an agency entrusted with actively
administering the law.194 The California Privacy Protection Agency has
powers to promulgate, revise, and implement regulations interpreting
CCPA,195 as well as the authority to conduct hearings, subpoena witnesses,
compel testimony, and impose fines for violations of CCPA.196 The agency
is also tasked with ensuring that regulated businesses perform regular
185. See id. § 1798.125(a).
186. CCPA’s right to nondiscrimination includes a notable exception under which
businesses may discriminate by “offer[ing] a different price, rate, level, or quality of goods or
services to the consumer if that price or difference is directly related to the value provided to
the business by the consumer’s data.” Id. § 1798.125(b)(1). This is known as the “Spotify
exception” because the music streaming service provides a free tier paid for by targeted
advertising. See Lapowsky, supra note 155.
187. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
188. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.192 (West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
189. See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.300–999.337 (2021).
190. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.130(a)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2021).
191. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 999.312, 999.313, 999.315, 999.316, 999.318,
999.323–999.325 (2021).
192. See, e.g., id. § 999.305 (notice at collection); id. § 999.306 (notice of the right to opt
out); id. § 999.307 (notice of a financial incentive); id. § 999.332 (notices to consumers under
sixteen years old).
193. See id. § 999.308.
194. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.199.10 (West 2021).
195. Id. § 1798.199.40(b).
196. Id. §§ 1798.199.55(a), 1798.199.65.
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cybersecurity audits and submit security risk assessment reports.197 By its
terms, CCPA requires that the agency is comprised of members most
qualified to administer the law.198
Yet what CCPA gave in the way of administrative enforcement, it took
away in the availability of a private right of action.199 Under CCPA, a private
right of action only arises when “nonencrypted and nonredacted personal
information . . . is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or
disclosure as a result of the business’s violation of the duty to implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices.”200 Maintaining a
private right of action therefore requires not only a specialized type of
security breach but also proof that the business’s poor security procedures
and practices enabled it. Moreover, a private cause of action is only available
if the aggrieved party provides the business with notice of the alleged
violation and with thirty days to cure it, a mechanism that effectively
establishes a safe harbor.201 Lastly, where CCPA establishes administrative
penalties of up to $7500 per intentional violation or up to $2500 per all other
violations,202 it only permits individuals to recover up to $750 per consumer
per incident in private actions.203
With these limitations, CCPA
distinguishes itself from BIPA’s approach to data propertization in that it
grants broader rights for the price of narrower enforcement mechanisms.
3. Moving Forward
CPRA bound CCPA to data propertization because it expressly requires
that all future amendments be “consistent with and further the purpose and
intent of [the] act.”204 What remains to be seen, however, is how CCPA as
amended will play out on the ground: CPRA took effect on December 16,
2020, but administrative enforcement by the California Privacy Protection
Agency does not begin until July 1, 2023.205 With CCPA compliance costs
expected to be as high as $55 billion statewide,206 CCPA’s success will
197. Id. § 1798.185(a)(15).
198. See id. § 1798.199.10(a) (“[A]ppointments [to the agency’s board] should be made
from among Californians with expertise in the areas of privacy, technology, and consumer
rights.”).
199. Cf. Kerry & Chin, supra note 158 (“[A]ny passable federal privacy law . . . is likely
to require a more robust private right of action.”).
200. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (West 2021). Compare this with BIPA, which
provides a private cause of action even absent an injury in fact. See supra notes 144–47 and
accompanying text.
201. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(b) (West 2021).
202. See id. § 1798.155(b). Compare these penalty maximums with those set by BIPA. See
supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text.
203. See id. § 1798.150(a)(1)(A).
204. 2020 California Proposition 24, § 25.
205. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(d) (West 2021).
206. BERKELEY ECON. ADVISING & RSCH., STANDARDIZED REGULATORY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT OF 2018 REGULATIONS 11 (2019); see
also Dipayan Ghosh, What You Need to Know About California’s New Data Privacy Law,
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 11, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/what-you-need-to-know-aboutcalifornias-new-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/72YJ-MJJ2] (noting that businesses
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depend on the success of efforts to enforce it.207 CCPA’s limited private
right of action208 already effectively establishes an injury-in-fact requirement
not present in BIPA.209 As a result, Californians will lack a direct method
for seeking redress for CCPA violations, and the burden of enforcing data
property interests will fall on the agency.210
Notwithstanding these issues, CCPA embodies a return to the “California
Effect”: California is expected to become the standard-bearer in all matters
data property and privacy, as CCPA is expected to be widely applicable and
substantially impactful.211 Although CCPA provides for limited avenues for
private enforcement, it nonetheless makes a substantial step in the data
propertization story because it grants a larger scope of property rights
protected by the state. At the very least, “CCPA’s legacy may not be the law
itself, but the laws it inspires.”212
C. Virginia: The Consumer Data Protection Act
Next in the story of data propertization is Virginia’s Consumer Data
Protection Act213 (VCDPA), signed into law by Governor Ralph Northam on
dealing in data must “either reform their global data protection and data rights infrastructures
to comply with California’s law, or institute a patchwork data regime in which Californians
are treated one way and everyone else another. That last option can be more expensive for
companies”).
207. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text; Rahman v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,
No. SA CV 20-00654, 2021 WL 346421, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2021) (“[I]n order for
Plaintiff’s claims to survive Defendant’s motion [to dismiss], the unauthorized access of
personal information on its own, without the access of further sensitive information, must be
sufficient to establish injury in fact”). Some have argued that the injury-in-fact requirement
prevents the law from adequately protecting individuals and allowing them to seek redress for
harms. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 15, at 146–47 (“[T]he injury-in-fact inquiry enshrines a
distinctively neoliberalized conception of the judicial role in which courts function principally
to discipline deviations from marketplace norms rather than to correct more systematic
marketplace excesses. That stance foregrounds harms that are discrete, individuated, and
preferably monetizable . . . [but] positions more diffuse, systematic market and sociotechnical
dynamics as presumptively normal—an approach that is calculated to leave most complaints
about accountability for economic activity at the courthouse door.”); see also Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 63, at 205 (“[I]f privacy is once recognized as a right entitled to legal
protection, the interposition of the courts cannot depend on the particular nature of the injuries
resulting.”).
210. Proposed solutions to this problem have so far failed. For example, a California bill
that would have actively granted a broader private right of action failed to garner sufficient
support. See Press Release, ACLU of N. Cal., California Legislature Caves to Big Tech
Pressure Again and Undermines Consumer Privacy Rights (May 16, 2019),
https://www.aclunc.org/news/california-legislature-caves-big-tech-pressure-again-andundermines-consumer-privacy-rights [https://perma.cc/B5B7-35UV].
211. See supra note 116; Chander et al., supra note 154, at 1737 (“California has emerged
as a kind of privacy superregulator, catalyzing privacy law in the United States”).
212. Sara Morrison, California’s New Privacy Law, Explained, VOX (Dec. 30, 2019,
6:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/30/21030754/ccpa-2020-california-privacylaw-rights-explained [https://perma.cc/68JM-CQD5]; see also Chander et al., supra note 154,
at 1787–88.
213. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-575 to 59.1-585 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
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March 2, 2021.214 The Virginia legislature did not unanimously pass
VCDPA as Illinois’s did with BIPA215 and as California’s did with CCPA,216
but the law nonetheless benefited from broad legislative support in that
identical versions of the bill passed in each chamber.217 When it passed,
VCDPA became only the second privacy law in the nation following
CCPA,218 but it was the third law of its type, following BIPA and CCPA, to
further data propertization. VCDPA furthers data propertization because it
mirrors BIPA and CCPA in the rights and enforcement mechanisms that it
establishes.219 However, key differences between BIPA’s, CCPA’s, and
VCDPA’s reporting requirements,220 opt-out rights,221 and enforcement
mechanisms222 will begin to reveal the dangers of overlapping state data
propertization regimes.
1. Rights and Duties
VCDPA takes a cue from CCPA by vesting property interests in a large
swath of data,223 with exceptions for data that is de-identified or publicly
available,224 if not otherwise regulated by federal law.225 Moreover, like
CCPA, VCDPA’s broad definitional coverage is complemented by grants of
possessory rights (the right to know226 and the right to access227),
exclusionary rights (the right to delete228 and the right to opt out229), and
alienability rights (the right to portability230 and the right to
nondiscrimination231). Finally, like CCPA, VCDPA protects these rights by
imposing a duty to limit the data processing to initially disclosed purposes,232
maintain reasonable data security practices,233 and conduct regular security

214. See 2021 Va. Acts 35; 2021 Va. Acts 36; Cat Zakrzewski, Virginia Governor Signs
Nation’s Second State Consumer Privacy Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2021, 8:17 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/03/02/privacy-tech-data-virgina/
[https://perma.cc/A72Q-ZXSA].
215. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
217. See H.B. 2307, 1st Spec. Sess. (Va. 2021); S.B. 1392, Reg. Sess. (Va. 2021).
218. See Zakrzewski, supra note 214.
219. See infra Part II.C.1.
220. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 236–39 and accompanying text.
222. See infra Part II.C.2.
223. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023) (defining “personal
data” as “any information that is linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or identifiable
natural person.”).
224. See id.
225. See id. § 59.1-576(C).
226. See id. §§ 59.1-577(A)(1), 59.1-578(C).
227. See id. § 59.1-577(A)(1).
228. See id. § 59.1-577(A)(3).
229. See id. § 59.1-577(A)(5).
230. See id. § 59.1-577(A)(4).
231. See id. § 59.1-578(A)(4).
232. See id. § 59.1-578(A)(2).
233. See id. § 59.1-578(A)(3).
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assessments.234 In these respects, VCDPA serves almost as a jurisdictional
expansion of CCPA by replicating the rights that CCPA establishes.
Emphasis on “almost.” Indeed, VCDPA is perhaps more interesting in the
ways in which it deviates from CCPA. For example, under CCPA,
businesses must prepare regular security assessments covering their
“processing of personal information” broadly, but under VCDPA, businesses
need only detail targeted advertising, sales, profiling, sensitive data
processing, and any processing that presents a heightened risk of harm to
consumers.235 Similarly, a consumer who opts out of data processing under
VCDPA only thereafter prevents businesses from selling that data, using it
for targeted advertising, or using it for “profiling in furtherance of decisions
that produce legal or similarly significant effects.”236 It does not, by contrast,
prevent those businesses from otherwise sharing that data—a common
practice banned by CCPA’s right to opt out.237 This limitation is further
entrenched by VCDPA’s definition of a data “sale,” which covers only “the
exchange of personal data for monetary consideration.”238 Compare this
with CCPA, which extends the definition of a “sale” to “other valuable
consideration” and accordingly empowers an individual to opt out of equally
valuable nonmonetary exchanges.239
But not all of VCDPA’s deviations from CCPA render it more restrictive
in its approach to data propertization. Taking a cue from CCPA, VCDPA
defines a set of data deemed “sensitive,”240 and taking a cue from BIPA,
requires businesses to obtain a consumer’s informed consent before
businesses can process such data.241 And although VCDPA defines sensitive
data more narrowly than CCPA does,242 VCDPA’s opt-in right creates a
stronger property right in those types of data than does CCPA by providing
a stronger right to exclusion.243 Given these differences, the Virginian
property interest in data is weaker than its Californian counterpart in some
respects (for example, through its limited definition of a sale),244 yet stronger
in others (for example, through its opt-in right).245

234. See id. § 59.1-580.
235. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(a)(15)(B) (West 2021), with VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-580 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
236. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-577(A)(5) (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
237. See supra note 176.
238. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
239. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(t)(1) (West 2021); see also supra note 176.
240. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023) (defining “[s]ensitive
data”).
241. See id. § 59.1-578(A)(5); id. § 59.1-575 (defining “[c]onsent as “a clear affirmative
act signifying a consumer’s freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous agreement”).
242. For example, CCPA includes social security numbers as well as “[t]he contents of a
consumer’s mail, email, and text messages” in its definition of “sensitive personal
information,” but VCDPA does not. Compare CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.140(ae)(1) (West 2021),
with VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
243. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 236–39 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text.

1728

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

2. Enforcement
Unlike CCPA, VCDPA is unequivocal in its state-centric approach: the
state attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce the law.246 Thus,
there is no administering agency and no private right of action under
VCDPA, and the law’s sponsors justify these decisions by arguing that they
prevent opportunistic plaintiffs and lawyers from “‘turn[ing] this into another
business’ by creating opportunities for lots of lawsuits.”247 Moreover,
VCDPA establishes not just a narrow avenue for enforcement but also wide
latitude for the regulated: the law codifies a safe harbor permitting
businesses to avoid litigation if they correct alleged violations of the law
within thirty days.248 With this in mind, it is difficult to see just how effective
VCDPA will be in allowing private individuals to seek redress for data harms
and enforce their moral rights to property.249 Although VCDPA largely
adopts CCPA’s approach to establishing broad data property rights, it
concurrently peels back on the enforcement methods needed to protect them,
leading to weaker property interests overall.250
3. Moving Forward
VCDPA does not go into effect until January 2023,251 so its full impact
will not be known until Virginian consumers and businesses try their hands
at interpreting the law. A work group established under VCDPA252 recently
published a report outlining recommendations on how to address the law’s
shortcomings,253 but whether and to what extent those recommendations will
be adopted remains to be seen. For now, all that is clear is that VCDPA
selectively mimics, but does not mirror, CCPA’s approach to data
246. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-584(A) (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
247. Gopal Ratnam, Virginia Set to Become Second State to Pass Data Privacy Law, ROLL
CALL (Feb. 16, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2021/02/16/virginia-set-tobecome-second-state-to-pass-data-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/29MY-CFFR] (quoting
statement of Senator David Marsden).
248. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-584(B) (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023). Compare this with
CCPA, which provides a safe harbor for private actions but not administrative ones. See supra
note 201 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text.
250. The lack of robust enforcement mechanisms led pro-privacy groups to lobby Virginia
lawmakers to “hit the brakes on [the] bill.” Hayley Tsukayama, Virginians Deserve Better
Than This Empty Privacy Law, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/02/virginians-deserve-better-empty-privacy-law
[https://perma.cc/P55Q-MHN9]; see also Group Letter Opposing Weak Industry-Backed
Privacy Bill in Virginia, U.S. PUB. INT. RSCH. GRP. (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://uspirg.org/resources/usp/group-letter-opposing-weak-industry-backed-privacy-billvirginia [https://perma.cc/4MDZ-EVED].
251. See 2021 Va. Acts 35, § 4; 2021 Va. Acts 36, § 4.
252. See 2021 Va. Acts 35, § 2; 2021 Va. Acts 36, § 2.
253. See JOINT COMM’N ON TECH. & SCI., VIRGINIA CONSUMER DATA PROTECTION ACT
WORK GROUP: 2021 FINAL REPORT (2021), https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2021/
RD595/PDF [https://perma.cc/Z8VF-9DX6]. Some notable suggestions from the report
include removing the right to cure from the law “to prevent companies from exploiting this
provision” and reconsidering the law’s definitions for “sale.” Id. at 2.

2022]

ON THE PROPERTIZATION OF DATA

1729

propertization, while taking some aspects from BIPA to fill existing statutory
gaps.
D. Colorado: The Colorado Privacy Act
Completing the quartet of American data privacy legislation is the
Colorado Privacy Act (CPA),254 signed into law by Governor Jared Polis on
July 7, 2021.255 Like CCPA and VCDPA, CPA advances data propertization
by conferring key rights in a broad swath of data covered by the law.256 By
its very terms, the law seeks to prevent “[t]he unauthorized disclosure of
personal information and loss of privacy [which] can have devastating
impacts.”257 Although similar prefatory language does not exist in either
CCPA or VCDPA,258 CPA functions similarly to BIPA, CCPA, and VCDPA
in bolstering consumers’ bundles of rights in their data in an effort to protect
them from data harms.
1. Rights and Duties
CPA adopts the now-familiar formula of granting possessory rights (the
right to know and the right to access259), exclusionary rights (the right to
delete260 and the right to opt out261), and alienability rights (the right to
portability262) in a bundle. CPA also takes a cue from VCDPA and
strengthens the property interest in sensitive data with an informed consent
requirement.263 Lastly, like BIPA, CCPA, and VCDPA, CPA imposes
exacting duties on businesses to minimize and limit data processing and
collection to “reasonably necessary” purposes not exceeding the original
intended scope of the activity.264 CPA’s prefatory language doubles down
254. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1301 to 6-1-1313 (2021) (effective July 1, 2023).
255. See 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445, 3467; see also Webb McArthur & Dailey Wilson,
Colorado Governor Signs Nation’s Third Comprehensive Consumer Data Privacy Law,
AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/
publications/blt/2021/08/data-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/39B9-96K7].
256. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1303(17) (2021) (effective July 1, 2023) (defining
“personal data” as “information that is linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or
identifiable individual”); id. § 6-1-1304(2)–(3) (listing exceptions).
257. Id. § 6-1-1302(a)(V).
258. For similar language in BIPA, see supra notes 121, 124.
259. CPA collapses the right to know into the right to access. See id. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 6-1-1306(b) (2021) (effective July 1, 2023).
260. Id. § 6-1-1306(d).
261. Id. § 6-1-1306(a)(I).
262. Id. § 6-1-1306(e).
263. Id. § 6-1-1308(7); see also id. § 6-1-1303(5) (defining “[c]onsent” as “a clear,
affirmative act signifying a consumer’s freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous
agreement”); supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text (VCDPA). CPA largely mimics
VCDPA’s definition of “sensitive data” but narrows it further by excluding precise
geolocation data. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1303(24)(a) (2021) (effective July 1,
2023), with VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
264. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1304(4)(a) (2021) (effective July 1, 2023)
(“Personal data . . . [s]hall not be processed for any purpose other than a purpose expressly
listed . . . or as otherwise authorized”); id. § 6-1-1308(3) (“A controller’s collection of
personal data must be adequate, relevant, and limited to what is reasonably necessary in
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on this duty of care with reference to businesses as mere “custodians” of
consumer data: “By enacting [CPA], Colorado will be among the states that
empower consumers to protect their privacy and require companies to be
responsible custodians of data as they continue to innovate.”265
But CPA differs from both CCPA and VCDPA in two notable respects.
First, CPA does not grant consumers with a right to nondiscrimination,
thereby exposing consumers who exercise their data property rights to lower
quality or more expensive goods and services, even when the difference is
not at all related to the value of the consumer’s data. News organizations
would therefore be prohibited from blocking access to their articles if
Californians or Virginians chose to exclude the companies from using their
biometric data, but not if Coloradoans were to do the same thing.266
Second, consumers who opt out of the processing of their data under CPA
can only prevent a business from selling their data, using it for targeted
advertising, or using it for “[p]rofiling in furtherance of decisions that
produce legal or similarly significant effects concerning a consumer.”267 As
a result, when an opt-out right is exercised, a business must refrain from a
wider set of activities in California than in Virginia and Colorado268 but may
concurrently discriminate against Colorado consumers in price or quality but
not against those in California or Virginia.269 Though the rights granted
under CPA generally advance data propertization and generally mirror
CCPA and VCDPA, differences between BIPA, CCPA, and VCDPA not
only lead to consumer uncertainty about the strength and extent of their new
property rights to data but also to interstate differences in consumer
treatment.
2. Enforcement
CPA further distinguishes itself with a novel approach to enforcement. For
example, CPA does not establish an agency tasked with enforcing the new
law (unlike CCPA)270 nor does it allow for a private right of action271 (unlike
relation to the specified purposes for which the data are processed.”); id. § 6-1-1304(4)(b)
(“Personal data . . . [s]hall be processed solely to the extent that the processing is necessary,
reasonable, and proportionate to the specific purpose or purposes listed . . . or as otherwise
authorized”); id. § 6-1-1308(4) (“A controller shall not process personal data for purposes that
are not reasonably necessary to or compatible with the specified purposes for which the
personal data are processed, unless the controller first obtains the consumer’s consent.”).
265. Id. § 6-1-1302(c)(I); see also supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
266. Both CCPA and VCDPA grant a right to nondiscrimination. See supra notes 185–86,
231 and accompanying text.
267. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1306(a)(I) (2021) (effective July 1, 2023). This mirrors
VCDPA’s model. See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text.
268. Compare supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing California’s broad
opt-out right), with supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text (describing Virginia’s narrow
opt-out right), and supra note 267 and accompanying text (describing Colorado’s narrow
opt-out right).
269. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text.
271. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1311(1)(b) (2021) (effective July 1, 2023);
id. § 6-1-1310.
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CCPA and BIPA).272 Instead, like under VCDPA, enforcement falls entirely
on the state, but with three key deviations. First, CPA temporarily adopts the
cure period limited under CCPA273 and adopted by VCDPA274 and extends
it to sixty days.275 Second, CPA vests enforcement authority mainly in the
state’s attorney general but extends that authority to district attorneys.276
And third, CPA grants the attorney general limited rulemaking power to
clarify obligations under the law.277
These legislative choices suggest that, rather than simply expand CCPA or
VCDPA on their terms, CPA adopts a new approach to data propertization.
CPA, for example, hews close to VCDPA by adopting a safe harbor provision
in the short run but also provides for the repeal of that provision in the long
run.278 Also, although CPA does not establish an agency tasked with
enforcing the law, CPA nonetheless extends the right of action beyond the
attorney general to district attorneys279 and grants the attorney general
limited rulemaking power to preempt potentially weak court interpretations
of the law with fully informed, prospective interpretations.280
3. Moving Forward
CPA is not effective until July 1, 2023,281 but gaps in data propertization
are already becoming evident. The coverage between BIPA, CCPA,
VCDPA, and CPA already differs, but additional differences in the rights and
enforcement mechanisms among the four only serve to further jeopardize the
development of a strong, coherent property interest in data. For example,
where the strength of an owner’s exclusionary right determines the strength
of a property interest,282 Virginians’ and Coloradoans’ property interest in
sensitive data is stronger than Californians’ simply because VCDPA and
CPA adopt an opt-in approach, whereas CCPA adopts an opt-out
approach.283 Similarly, where a property interest is only as strong as the
enforcement mechanisms designed to protect it,284 more forgiving safe

272. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text (CCPA); supra notes 136–38 (BIPA).
273. The CCPA safe harbor is available only in private enforcement actions. See supra note
201 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 248.
275. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1311(d) (2021) (effective July 1, 2023).
276. See id. § 6-1-1311(a).
277. See id. § 6-1-1313.
278. CPA abolishes the safe harbor provision on January 1, 2025. See id. § 6-1-1311(d).
279. See id. § 6-1-1311(a).
280. See id. § 6-1-1313.
281. See 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445, § 7.
282. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
283. Compare supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text (describing VCDPA’s opt-in
regime), and supra note 263 and accompanying text (describing CPA’s opt-in regime), with
supra notes 176, 179 and accompanying text (describing CCPA’s opt-out regime).
284. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.

1732

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

harbor provisions in VCDPA285 and CPA286 than in CCPA287 means that
businesses could adopt less stringent data-handling procedures vis-à-vis
Virginian and Coloradoan residents than with California residents because
VCDPA and CPA allow for a greater margin for error. With so many other
differentials in the strength of rights granted and enforcement mechanisms
established under each law, it becomes clear why property interests in data
are difficult to identify and why there is little agreement on whether data
propertization is happening at all.288
III. DATA PROPERTIZATION AS IT SHOULD BE
In Part I, this Note discussed how a property interest in data might arise
and operate before exploring the scholarship surrounding data propertization.
Notwithstanding the ongoing debate, Part II illustrated that data
propertization is already underway in Illinois, California, Virginia, and
Colorado under the banner of data protection and privacy. Specifically,
BIPA, CCPA, VCDPA, and CPA establish property interests in data because
they establish rights that mirror the rights of possession, exclusion, and
alienability that are emblematic of a property interest.289
Yet, Part II also illustrated that gaps and differences among the quartet
jeopardize the development of a strong, coherent property interest. To
address this issue, this Note prescribes a harmonized bundle of rights best
suited to developing property interests in data and argues that those rights
should be codified in federal law, dually enforced through agency
enforcement and a private right of action. Such an approach would eliminate
gaps between existing data propertization laws and stop the proliferation of
others as more states seek to enact similar laws.290

285. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 273–75, 278 and accompanying text.
287. The CCPA safe harbor is available only in private enforcement actions. See supra note
201 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., Determann, supra note 98, at 25 (“[E]xcept for exclusion rights, data
protection and privacy laws diverge from property laws.”).
289. See supra Parts II.A (BIPA), II.B (CCPA), II.C (VCDPA), and II.D (CPA).
290. The Indiana Senate notably passed its own version of a data protection and privacy
law, S.B. 358, on February 1, 2022. See Indiana Senate Unanimously Passes Privacy Bill,
IAPP (Feb. 2, 2022), https://iapp.org/news/a/indiana-senate-unanimously-passes-privacy-bill/
[https://perma.cc/65GV-3NA3]. Recent reporting suggests that the bill largely mirrors
VCDPA and will likely be enacted into law after it is submitted to the Indiana House of
Representatives for a vote. See Jake Holland, Indiana Senate Passes Consumer Privacy Bill
Lacking Right to Sue, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 2, 2022, 2:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/privacy-and-data-security/
X5OK3CM4000000?bna_news_filter=privacy-and-data-security
[https://perma.cc/YH96ET8R]. The bill’s swift passage reinforces this Note’s prediction of increased fragmentation
in approaches to data propertization and its claim that a harmonized federal law is increasingly
needed. These considerations are top of mind as Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, among other states, ramp up their efforts to advance similar
data protection and privacy legislation. See Taylor Kay Lively, US State Privacy Legislation
Tracker,
IAPP,
https://iapp.org/resources/article/us-state-privacy-legislation-tracker/
[https://perma.cc/4C8W-DGQ8] (Jan. 20, 2022).
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A. Toward a Harmonization of Data Property Rights
“Roughly six-in-ten Americans (63%) say they have very little or no
understanding of the laws and regulations that are currently in place to protect
their privacy.”291 This is worrisome considering mounting efforts to
empower Americans to take control of their data. Does reform really occur
if no one notices it is happening? To establish strong property interests in
data, this section argues that federal law must grant clear, consistent, and
strong rights to possess, exclude, and alienate in the first instance.
Specifically, this Note proposes the following bundle of rights adopted from
CCPA, VCDPA, and CPA: the right to possess should mirror existing rights
to know and access the same types of data.292 The right to exclude should
mirror existing rights to delete but adopt the Virginian and Coloradoan
approach establishing a hybrid right to opt in and out of data collection and
use.293 Lastly, the right to alienate should mirror existing rights to portability
but adopt the Californian approach to the right to nondiscrimination, which
provides a narrow exception for commodifying data.294 Harmonization in
this fashion will not only unify CCPA, VCDPA, and CPA but will affirm
BIPA’s embrace of data propertization by expanding its definitional
coverage,295 established rights,296 and framework for enforcement.297
1. The Right to Possession
Of the three rights, it is easiest to establish a harmonized right to possession
because CCPA, VCDPA, and CPA already agree on the basics: data
protection and privacy laws must cover a broad swath of data298 and
empower consumers with the right to know what data is being collected299
and the right to access that data.300 Combining CCPA, VCDPA, and CPA
approaches to possessory rights would harmonize data propertization
regimes by establishing a singular definition of data.301 Collapsing BIPA
into that regime would additionally provide a considerable harmonizing
291. PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 9, at 10.
292. See infra Part III.A.1.
293. See infra Part III.A.2.
294. See infra Part III.A.3.
295. BIPA only propertizes biometric data, see supra note 120, while CCPA, VCDPA, and
CPA all cover a larger swath of data. See supra notes 159–67 and accompanying text (CCPA);
supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text (VCDPA), supra note 256 and accompanying text
(CPA).
296. BIPA does not establish the same bundle of rights that CCPA, VCDPA, and CPA do.
See supra Part II.A.1.
297. BIPA does not establish agency enforcement of the law. See supra Part II.A.2.
298. See supra notes 159–67 and accompanying text (CCPA); supra notes 223–25 and
accompanying text (VCDPA); supra note 256 and accompanying text (CPA).
299. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text (CCPA); supra note 226 and
accompanying text (VCDPA); supra note 259 and accompanying text (CPA).
300. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (CCPA); supra note 227 and
accompanying text (VCDPA); supra note 259 and accompanying text (CPA).
301. For their respective definitions of covered data, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1)
(West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 6-1-1303(17) (2021) (effective July 1, 2023).
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effect, as it would expand the law to cover more types of Illinoisan data
beyond biometric data.302
2. The Right to Exclude
Next, establishing a harmonized right to exclude is essential to forming a
more resolute property interest in data.303 Under current data propertization
regimes, the right to exclude translates into the right to delete data in
another’s possession304 and either the right to opt in305 or out306 of data
collection and use. Establishing a harmonized right to delete in the first
instance is key to bolstering the property interest as it recognizes the idea that
businesses hold others’ data only for as long as the owner wishes. In other
words, an individual’s exercise of the right to delete signifies a retraction of
consent, at which point businesses must end their possession by deleting the
data from their servers and records.
Additional duties that bar unilateral subsequent transfers of data,307
mandate regular security practices,308 and require data minimization
principles309 also enhance a data owner’s property interest by ensuring that
those without permission to access their data continue to be excluded from
it. Specifically, they address issues arising from data’s non-rivalry and
non-excludability310 by establishing legal duties designed to protect the data
from exfiltration or theft to the maximum extent possible. Accordingly,
incorporating those duties into a harmonized property interest in data would

302. See supra note 120.
303. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (CCPA); supra note 228 and
accompanying text (VCDPA); supra note 260 and accompanying text (CPA). In Illinois, the
right to exclude under BIPA preempts individual choice and requires the destruction of
biometric data once the initial purpose for its collection has been satisfied. See 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 14/15(a) (2021). Such a strong requirement is likely unnecessary for all types of data,
and a harmonized right to exclude should instead prioritize an individual’s right to
affirmatively delete data.
305. BIPA’s opt-in right imposes an informed consent requirement for all data covered by
the law. See supra notes 124–26, 129 and accompanying text. VCDPA and CPA, meanwhile,
only impose an informed consent requirement for a narrow set of sensitive data. See supra
notes 241–43 and accompanying text (VCDPA); supra note 263 and accompanying text
(CPA).
306. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (CCPA); supra note 229 and
accompanying text (regarding nonsensitive data under VCDPA,); supra note 261 and
accompanying text (regarding nonsensitive data under CPA).
307. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text (BIPA); supra notes 170, 173 and
accompanying text (CCPA).
308. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text (BIPA); supra notes 233–34 and
accompanying text (VCDPA).
309. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (BIPA); supra note 172 and accompanying
text (CCPA); supra note 232 and accompanying text (VCDPA); supra note 264 and
accompanying text (CPA).
310. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
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limit moral hazard concerns311 and solidify the idea that businesses and other
entities should be responsible custodians of the data in their possession.312
Under the right to opt in, individuals hold all the power because every
business needs consent before that business can access someone else’s
data.313 A right to opt in could implicate all data regulated by the law, as is
the case with BIPA,314 or only a small subset of data meriting additional
protection, as is the case with VCDPA315 and CPA.316 Alternatively, under
a right to opt out under CCPA,317 VCDPA,318 and CPA,319 a consumer may
prospectively exclude businesses from thereafter engaging in certain data
activities—CCPA would ban all subsequent sale and sharing of that data,320
whereas VCDPA and CPA would only ban the subsequent sale, the use in
targeted advertising, and the use in profiling of that data.321
This Note takes the position that the Virginian and Coloradoan approaches
to consent,322 which establish an opt-out regime for most types of data but
craft a narrow opt-in regime for sensitive data, is the proper approach. Under
this hybrid approach, consent is required to collect or use a narrow set of
“sensitive” data but not for a wider set of “regular” data. This balances
economic concerns that an opt-in right that applies to all data would result in
wasteful and inefficient transaction costs323 with the reality that some forms
of data warrant heightened protection anyway, given the rise in data harms
that target such data.324 Similarly, where an opt-out right places the burden
on individuals to monitor and affirmatively assert their property interests in
data, a limited opt-in right at least recognizes a heightened privacy interest in
sensitive data by displacing a subset of those monitoring costs onto collecting
entities. In this regard, CCPA, VCDPA, and CPA provide an adequate
baseline for distinguishing between sensitive and regular data:325 they all
protect data that implicate a high privacy interest, such as biometric data and

311. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; supra note 88.
312. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text; see also supra note 265 and
accompanying text (citing prefatory language in CPA supporting the existence of such a duty).
313. See supra notes 85, 129.
314. See supra notes 126, 129 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 176 and accompanying text
318. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (VCDPA); supra note 267 and
accompanying text (CPA).
322. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text (VCDPA); supra note 263 and
accompanying text (CPA).
323. See supra notes 98–101.
324. See, e.g., supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 65–67 and
accompanying text (arguing that the strength of a property protection afforded must reflect the
privacy interest at stake).
325. For their respective definitions of “sensitive data,” see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(ae)
(West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (2021) (effective Jan. 1,
2023); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1303(24) (2021) (effective July 1, 2023).
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personal data revealing sex life or sexual orientation.326 The exact
delineation under a harmonized regime should be hammered out by
regulation so that the property interests can remain flexible and shift over
time as needed.327
Lastly, because exclusionary rights are central to any property interest,328
the exclusion must be strong: any use, sale, and sharing of data must be
prohibited before individuals exercise their opt-in right and after they
exercise their opt-out right.329 This Note already circumscribes the opt-in
right within a narrow class of sensitive data such that a harmonized approach
would minimize the number of times businesses will need consent to collect
or use that data. And there is very little justification for limiting the opt-out
right—if most consumers are ignorant of or do not care about how their data
is being exchanged or monetized,330 it follows that only the few who care
most about their data will take the steps to affirmatively exercise that right
anyway.331
3. The Right to Alienate
Lastly, this Note takes the position that a harmonized right to alienate
should prioritize data protection over data commodification to address
concerns that commodification may entrench existing inequalities through
consumer exploitation.332 Accordingly, rather than promoting alienation
through institutions that encourage individuals to sell their data,333 an
effective data propertization regime would passively protect alienation
decisions as they are made.
This is achieved by enshrining a right to nondiscrimination334 and a right
to portability.335 By prohibiting businesses from retaliating when data
owners exercise their rights and actively requiring businesses to help data
owners move their data as they wish, these rights protect an individual’s
alienation decisions rather than encourage them. This is not to say, however,
that all commodification should be prohibited. The nondiscrimination right
should include a narrow exception allowing businesses to offer a different
326. See supra note 325.
327. See infra note 370 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
329. Only CCPA bars the subsequent sale and sharing of data. VCDPA and CPA only bar
data’s subsequent sale, use in targeted advertising, and use in profiling. See supra notes
320–21 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 85.
332. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Laudon, supra note 25, at 99–101 (proposing the establishment of a
“National Information Market”); Lanier & Weyl, supra note 25 (proposing the establishment
of organizations called “mediators of individual data” charged with negotiating data royalties
and wages on behalf of data owners).
334. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text (CCPA); supra note 231 and
accompanying text (VCDPA). Illinois and Colorado do not establish a right to
nondiscrimination. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.D.1.
335. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (CCPA); supra note 230 and
accompanying text (VCDPA); supra note 262 and accompanying text (CPA).
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price or quality of goods depending on the value of data excluded from
them.336 This narrow exception serves the important end of balancing the
criticisms that consumers may be ignorant of or do not care about how their
data is being exchanged and monetized337 with the reality that data can
sometimes serve as a proxy for money in transactions for services.338 More
importantly, this exception serves an information-forcing purpose that leads
to increased innovation: if businesses want to continue receiving consumer
data through nonmonetary means, they will need to better explain how, why,
and to what extent they are providing services in exchange for data while
providing a high enough quality of service to convince consumers either to
opt in to the collection of sensitive data or to abstain from exercising their
right to opt out of regular data collection.339
B. Toward a Federalized Property Interest in Data
By selectively adopting the most effective features of current data
propertization laws, a harmonized bundle of data rights to possess, exclude,
and alienate bolster the underlying property interest in data. In this section,
this Note examines justifications for codifying such a property interest in
federal law and justifications for enforcing the underlying rights and
correlative duties through an administrative agency.
1. Establishing Federal Data Property Rights
Federal data laws in the United States are uncoordinated: some health data
is protected under the Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act of
1996,340 credit data is protected under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,341
financial data is protected by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,342 and so on.343
This fragmentation leads to two undesired results: it scatters what may
otherwise be a coherent set of rights and duties across the U.S. Code and
encourages states to fill resulting gaps in privacy law, which only adds further
to fragmentation of the nascent property interest.
Worse yet, the state problem is a compounding one. For example, scholars
have already begun to address mounting concerns that federal law may

336. This is already the approach under CCPA’s Spotify exception. See supra note 186.
337. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
339. See Schwartz, supra note 94, at 2100 (“[Information-forcing] . . . would place
pressure on the better-informed party to disclose material information about how personal data
will be used.”).
340. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
341. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 and 18 U.S.C.).
342. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12, 15, and 18 U.S.C.).
343. See Thorin Klosowski, The State of Consumer Data Privacy Laws in the US (and Why
It Matters), N.Y. TIMES WIRECUTTER (Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/
blog/state-of-privacy-laws-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/Q9LG-N8T3].
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preempt current data propertization laws.344 More importantly, permutations
in state-prescribed definitions, rights, and enforcement mechanisms build on
each other to aggrandize gaps between data propertization regimes. For
example, where gaps in coverage prevent Illinoisans from asserting property
rights to nonbiometric data in the same way that Californians, Virginians,
and Coloradoans can,345 the lack of a right to nondiscrimination prevents
Illinoisans and Coloradoans from exchanging their data for valuable services
in a way that Californians and Virginians are able to.346 All this, as the utter
lack of a private right of action under VCDPA and CPA bars Virginian and
Coloradoan data owners from directly asserting their property rights, while
its availability under BIPA and CCPA empowers Illinoisans and Californians
to do so.347
These and other gaps not only impose unnecessarily variable compliance
costs and establish inefficient barriers to entry348 but also increase the risk
that individuals will have starkly different conceptions of what they can and
cannot do with their data.349 Because data is an intangible good350 that does
not know borders,351 adopting a state-dependent approach to data
propertization necessarily means that each law will always be weaker in some
respects and stronger in others than the rest. Moreover, as GDPR did not
propertize data on standard terms worldwide through an unstoppable
Brussels Effect,352 no single state law can ever do the same for the United

344. See generally, e.g., Katherine Q. Morrow, Preemption Problem: Does ERISA
Preempt the California Consumer Privacy Act?, 99 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2021) (addressing
conflicts with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act); Lauren Davis, The Impact of
the California Consumer Privacy Act on Financial Institutions Across the Nation, 24 N.C.
BANKING INST. 499 (2020) (addressing conflict with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). Compare,
e.g., Kiran K. Jeevanjee, Comment, Nice Thought, Poor Execution: Why the Dormant
Commerce Clause Precludes California’s CCPA from Setting National Privacy Law, 70 AM.
U. L. REV. F. 75 (2020) (arguing that CCPA likely cannot withstand a constitutional challenge
on Commerce Clause grounds), with Russell Spivak, Too Big a Fish in the Digital Pond?:
The California Consumer Privacy Act and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 U. CIN. L. REV.
475 (2019) (arguing the opposite).
345. See supra note 295.
346. See supra note 186.
347. Compare supra notes 246–50 and accompanying text (VCDPA), and supra note 271
and accompanying text (CPA), with supra notes 136–47 and accompanying text (BIPA), and
supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text (CCPA).
348. For example, a report on CCPA’s impact suggests that California businesses “will be
at a disadvantage when competing in markets outside of California, as they will be faced with
higher compliance costs relative to their competitors,” but will also gain a competitive
advantage through “barriers to entry for future competitors considering entering into the
California market.” BERKELEY ECON. ADVISING & RSCH., supra note 206, at 31–32.
349. See Simon G. Davies, Re-engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been
Transformed from a Right to a Commodity, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW
LANDSCAPE 143, 147 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (“The citizens of Western
industrialized countries want privacy, but feel it is extinct. They are aware of the loss of
privacy, but feel powerless to defend themselves against intrusive practices. These feelings
may be due in part to the increasing difficulty of defining privacy rights.”).
350. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
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States.353 Only a federalized data propertization regime that codifies
harmonized rights to possess, exclude, and alienate data within federal law
would fix these issues.
2. Protecting Federal Data Property Rights
Of course, part of establishing a federal property interest in data is
enforcing the rights and duties that come with it.354 In this regard, federal
enforcement of the interest can correct power imbalances in which data
owners with diffuse interests would be otherwise disadvantaged when facing
organized data collectors with more focused interests.355 Additionally,
instrumentalization of federal agencies will help to ensure that property
interests in data are adequately monitored and protected where an
individual’s personal data may not have a high enough value to justify private
action.356 Accordingly, enforcement of a property interest in data must occur
by explicitly expanding the authority of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to investigate and litigate data harms357 or by establishing a new,
separate agency to do the same.358 In this regard, the Californian approach
in establishing a new agency to enforce CCPA359 is an appropriate one. Note,
however, that in protecting property interests in data, federal authorities must
take special care to find an optimal level of enforcement that neither merely
consists of burying companies in compliance obligations360 or imposing

353. Colorado and Virginia enacted their data propertization laws despite the California
Effect, and California enacted CCPA despite the Brussels and Illinois Effects. See supra notes
115–17 and accompanying text (discussing the Brussels Effect); supra notes 148–52 and
accompanying text (discussing the Illinois Effect); supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text
(discussing the California Effect).
354. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
355. Under public choice theory, “large collectivities with diffuse interests will be
systematically disadvantaged in the political process as compared to smaller groups with more
acute interests because larger groups face higher organizing costs and are affected more
severely by incentives to free ride.” Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization
and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 811 (2008).
356. See Schwartz, supra note 94, at 2108–09.
357. The FTC currently asserts jurisdiction over data harm investigations and litigation by
claiming that the harms were the result of unfair and deceptive trade practices. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY 1 (2021). This is an
unnecessarily circuitous route. Expanding the FTC’s regulatory authority to explicitly cover
data harms would streamline and bolster those actions while avoiding the costs of establishing
an entirely new agency tasked with doing the same.
358. See, e.g., Kirsten Gillibrand, Facebook and Social Media Endanger Americans. We
Need a Federal Data Agency, NBC THINK (Oct. 25, 2021, 11:55 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/politics-policy/facebook-rcna3704 [https://perma.cc/RA7EVLZ7] (proposing a separate agency charged with monitoring data harms).
359. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text.
360. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773, 834
(2020) (arguing that “when . . . merely symbolic structures proliferate, they undermine the
substantive power of the law and shift the discourse of power, all to the detriment of consumer
privacy”).
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slaps on the wrist361 nor results in a disproportionately large burden on small
businesses.362
A federal agency tasked with protecting property interests in data also
requires significant regulatory authority.363 Here, the controlling agency
should be structured like the California Privacy Protection Agency, which is
run by members with relevant expertise364 empowered to enforce CCPA and
promulgate regulations interpreting it.365 At the federal level, such authority
would arise from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),366 which would
allow for substantial deference to agency expertise when reviewing decisions
of policy or interpretations of relevant data propertization legislation.367
Considering the rapidly changing nature of technology,368 this flexibility will
provide the agency with a margin for maneuver so that the agency can
respond adequately and swiftly to new data issues as they arise.
Notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA,369 for example, will allow
the agency to adjust the opt-in regime by reforming the line between sensitive
and nonsensitive data as the privacy interest in different types of data shifts
over time.370
Last in the issue of enforcement is the question of a private right of action.
Admittedly, more research is needed on whether and how much private
enforcement can and should be allowed under federal law. As we saw, BIPA
allows private actions to survive without an injury in fact.371 Under federal
law, however, actions must present a “concrete and particularized” injury in
361. See Emily Stewart, A $5 Billion Fine Won’t Fix Facebook. Here’s What Would., VOX
(Sept. 10, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/business-and-finance/2019/9/10/20857109/
facebook-equifax-companies-break-law [https://perma.cc/ZK26-N38N] (“If a monetary
penalty is big enough to affect the company’s bottom line or change the way it does business,
it can be effective. But in many cases, it’s not, especially when it comes to multi-billion-dollar
corporations. And fines ultimately get passed onto shareholders and workers, not company
decision makers.”).
362. See, e.g., BERKELEY ECON. ADVISING & RSCH., supra note 206, at 31 (“Small firms are
likely to face a disproportionately higher share of compliance costs relative to larger
enterprises.”).
363. Both CCPA and CPA provide some form of regulatory and rulemaking authority to
various agencies and executive offices. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text
(CCPA); supra note 277 and accompanying text (CPA).
364. See supra note 198 and accompanying text; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.199.15
(West 2021) (outlining qualifications and conduct expected of board members).
365. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.199.40(b) (West 2021).
366. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596.
367. Under APA’s review scheme, 5 U.S.C. § 706, policy decisions are reviewed under an
“arbitrary and capricious” standard. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983). Decisions rooted in interpretations of an underlying federal
statute are reviewed under a reasonableness standard. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984).
368. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
369. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
370. See supra notes 322–27 and accompanying text; see also Schwartz, supra note 94, at
2098–99 (“To ensure that the opt-in default leads to meaningful disclosure of additional
information, . . . the government must have a significant role in regulating the way that notice
of privacy practices is provided.”).
371. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.

2022]

ON THE PROPERTIZATION OF DATA

1741

fact to satisfy standing requirements in federal court.372 As a result, even if
federal data propertization legislation granted a private right of action for
litigation of injuries in law, standing requirements might keep such lawsuits
from entering federal courthouse doors.373 At the very least, there should be
some form of private enforcement because leaving enforcement solely in the
hands of the state would leave data owners without viable methods for
privately obtaining compensation for data harms or asserting moral rights to
their property.374
This Note does not seek to ignore the risk of opportunism375 and the
concern that the cost of private litigation may not justify its benefits.376
Instead, it argues that some form of private enforcement is needed to
supplement (rather than supplant) administrative enforcement.377
Accordingly, a proper approach to enforcement would hew toward the
Illinoisan378 and Californian regimes,379 which allow some form of private
enforcement, unlike the Virginian380 and Coloradoan381 approaches, which
leave enforcement completely in the hands of state attorneys general. An
effective federalized property interest in data would establish not only a
robust set of rights but also a strong set of enforcement mechanisms designed
to protect them.
CONCLUSION
Data propertization is underway, and there is no stopping it. This Note
began by examining data propertization through the lens of data and property.
Then, by analyzing state laws that fly under the banner of data protection and
privacy, this Note illustrated that carefully crafted rights, duties, and
enforcement mechanisms have begun to push data legislation away from
traditional consumer protection and toward data propertization. Methods
range in their embrace of property from those that prioritize exclusivity382 to
those that build regimes around a bundle of rights,383 but this Note asserted
that the ideal approach to empowering consumers and preventing data harms
hews toward the latter. Through a robust regime of rights, duties, and

372. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016); see also Transunion LLC v.
Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
373. See supra note 209.
374. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text (noting that both avenues for
enforcement serve distinct yet complementary goals).
378. See supra notes 136–47 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
382. See Own Your Own Data Act, S. 806, 116th Cong. (2019).
383. See, e.g., Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3300, 116th Cong. (2020); 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 14/1–99 (2021); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100 (West 2021); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 59.1-575 to 59.1-585 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1301
to 6-1-1313 (2021) (effective July 1, 2023).
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enforcement mechanisms, property law can grant ownership of data and
protect it in one fell swoop.
Though this approach to data propertization has shown some success in
Illinois, California, Virginia, and Colorado to the point of limited regulatory
globalization, a state-led approach risks becoming too fragmented to be
effective. Because data knows no borders, border-conscious variations
between the quartet of existing data propertization laws threaten to disrupt
the data propertization narrative and risk creating more problems than it
purports to solve. Accordingly, the federal data propertization regime
proposed by this Note has the greatest potential to establish a more cohesive
and more significant property interest in data that is more capable of
withstanding a new age of digital harms.

